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# The Europeanization of Romanian Political Parties<sup>\*</sup>

## The Ideological Level

CATERINA PREDA

"Without letting ourselves being surpassed by the overvaluation of the moment"<sup>1</sup>, it has to be taken into account that the rhythm of European integration of Romania is following a downward trend. Romania, a member of the "Helsinki group" began the negotiations for the European Union (EU) integration in February 2000. In spite of a series of generally positive annotations regarding the compliance with the political criteria, in February 2004<sup>2</sup>, the European Parliament' report questions Romania's fulfillment of the political criteria. Faced with this tensioned situation, a consensus of the party leaders was attained in order to ensure the pursuit by the government, of the integration negotiations. In addition, Romania has constantly registered, starting with 1990, one of the highest values of euro-enthusiasm of its population, compared with the other candidate countries. Subsequently, we could be tempted to conclude that an apparently tacit consensus subsists at the systemic level of both the elites and the Romanian citizens. This wide harmony concerning the desire to adhere at a common political and economical space could, at a first glance, satisfy our desire of inquiry. But can we remain circumscribed at the level of this judgment of a seeming consensus?

In order to clarify this query, the present research focuses on a specific aspect, *Romanian political parties and their rapport with a more general issue, that of Europeanization*. This study attempts to explain the structuring and the articulation of the Romanian political landscape after a decade of democracy and in the specific context of the negotiations for the European integration. More specifically the investigation bears on the manner in which the principal Romanian political parties integrate in their discourse the "European coordinate" and the modality in which these visions are articulated inside the party system. Therefore the analysis encloses a twofold approach: the systemic level and the party level. The seeming consensus in the auto-definition as European parties (vocationally) is striking. This leads to a closer examination of the parties' ideological manifestos, the discourses/speeches of the different political formations in order to try to decipher the options of each one so as to perceive the nuances/fine distinctions that individualize each party in relation to another.

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<sup>\*</sup> This article is the synthesis of a previous academic work, a Master Thesis (Mémoire de Diplôme d'Études Approfondies en Sciences Politiques) presented at the Université Libre de Bruxelles in September 2004: "L'influence de la construction européenne dans la structuration du système de partis roumain. Une européanisation des partis politiques roumains?"

<sup>1</sup> Slobodan MILACIC, "Critique de la transition unique. Notre épistémologie du postcommunisme dans le rétroviseur de la pensée unique", *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1996, pp. 19-40.

<sup>2</sup> At this period I began working on the original thesis.

The research focuses thus on the present parliamentary parties (2000-2004 legislature): Social Democrat Party (PSD), Democrat Party (PD), National Liberal Party (PNL), Union of Democratic Magyars of Romania (RDMSZ/UDMR) and Great Romania Party (PRM). Additionally the case of the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party (PNȚCD) will be studied because of its leading role in the previous large coalition government of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) between 1996 and 2000. The exploration follows the party development essentially in the period 1996-2004 given the increasing importance gained by the European issue after the 1996 elections (the alternation in power and the victory of the pro-European coalition) and even more important, after the publication by the European commission in 1997 of the Agenda 2000.

Hence, the analysis functions at two levels. On one side there is the systemic inquiry and, on the other side, the particular approach of the six case studies. The main research question is: *What role does "Europe" (as a cultural, historic and political space of reference) play in the consolidation of a party system in post-communist Romania?* A number of more specific questions arise in order to help us better close in on the terms of research. They are divided following the two levels of analysis.

1) The systemic approach refers to the analysis of the modalities according to which the Romanian party system is structured in relation to the "European issue". The depth/profoundness of the effective influence of "Europe" at the level of the post communist debate in Romania is under scrutiny.

2) The individual party approach is structured by the interrogation: *In what measure does the European coordinate influences the specific configuration of each party?* The different uses of "Europe" in the discourses of legitimacy of the political parties will be analyzed. Are there any specific visions or is there a complete convergence?

At the first level of systemic analysis, the main hypothesis develops as of Peter Mair' conclusion, who finds/enunciates that we can not really talk of an impact of Europeanization on party systems of EU member states, the impact of Europeanization on national party systems is minor<sup>1</sup>. The broad assumption of this proposed study is thus: *In Romania we don't assist at an Europeanization of the party system.* Nevertheless, the seeming consensus regarding "European questions" makes necessary a more detailed analysis, through the study of the programmatic documents (statutes, programs edited by the Congresses, electoral programs) of the role played by the "European coordinate" in the structuring of the Romanian party system. The first assumption can therefore be enlarged and a second one may be submitted: *The "European issue" is adopted and interiorized by the principal political parties, both at the systemic level and at the individual level. It is nonetheless a secondary coordinate, if not concealed, it doesn't represent a fundamental topic but a commonly accepted matter.*

The absence of a debate on the European integration, on the issues at stake and the future concessions to be made, incites us to further analyze the importance "Europe" bears in the party identity of the Romanian political parties. The subsequent hypothesis that this more in-depth query brings about at the party level of analysis are: 1) The pro-European attitude/stance of Romanian political parties' is centered more on a strategic choice than on a profound ideological option; 2) In this logic, the international legitimacy that the pan-European cooperation

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<sup>1</sup> Peter MAIR, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems", in Klaus H. GOETZ, Simon HIX (eds.) *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Party Systems*, Franck Cass Publishers, London, 2001, pp. 27-52.

(admission in the International parties also) ensures is consequently used at the national level as a "quality guarantee"; 3) In the same line, the government participation and thus the direct confrontation with concrete/real problems presented by the integration process is used as a source of legitimacy; 4) Given the delay in the negotiation of accession (and the sensibility of the Romanian public), the Europeanism of the Romanian parties is conceived in a strong interdependence with the defense of questions related to the national interest; 5) And thus the seeming consensus hides particular visions linked to the post-communist evolution of each political formation.

Consequently the declared purpose of this study is to give an image of Romanian post-communism through a "European reading" by the means of questions related to a European identity. Our primary interest is represented by political parties, but in order to analyze their choices, it is necessary to place them in a larger perspective, that is inside the national party system. We will only refer to the aspects relevant in respect to the European dimension of our case studies, the general context of post-communist Romania being too large to be encompassed in such a short study.

Additional elements must be taken into consideration. An important component of the European path of the Romanian political parties is to be found at the level of the pan-European cooperation of political parties/transnational collaboration; furthermore the process of negotiation and adhesion to the International parties represents an important aspect in the logic of "*legitimacy through importation*". The Europhile character of Romanian political parties is whilst encompassing more than targeted. The political parties, the political actors operate an automatic association (confusion or implicit association) between the processes of integration in the European and NATO structures (as well as between all the western European organizations, OECD, OEU, etc.), the interchangeable term used in this sense is "Euro Atlantic integration"<sup>1</sup>. Without a declared desire of "specificity"<sup>2</sup> our analysis will focus on an approach designed to demonstrate the "logic of compensation"<sup>3</sup> as Cristian Preda called it, established in Romania between the two integrationist processes.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. INTERTWINED THEORIES

### *The Systemic Approach*

As it was already stated, in order to acknowledge the potential influence that "Europe" exerts in the consolidation of the Romanian party system after 1989, a two-level analysis will be privileged. In a first stance a short theoretical detour is

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<sup>1</sup> On the other side, as Daniel Barbu observed, the process of European integration is much more technical and less spectacular in terms of foreign policy; therefore it occupies a secondary place in respect to NATO integration that brings about stronger emotions and represents a more weight-bearing issue in political terms. Daniel BARBU, *Șapte teme de politică românească*, Antet, București, 1997, pp. 212-216.

<sup>2</sup> That is considering the Romanian case as unique. See for example, Bruno DREWSKI, "Les partis politiques polonais et l'intégration européenne", in Pascal DELWIT, Jean Michel DE WAELE (éds.), *La démocratisation en Europe Centrale*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1998, pp. 99-119/p.101

<sup>3</sup> Term used by Cristian Preda: "Roumanie: entre Atlantisme et Intégration Européenne", Les Conférences de Midi, organized by Commission Européenne, Direction Générale Personnel et Administration – Unité Formation Admin 3, 11 November 2003.

operated so as to better circumscribe the proposed specific analytical concern. Secondly, the focus of the research will be placed on the six case studies so as to establish if the theoretical approach matches the Romanian reality.

At the first level of analysis, the systemic one, the investigation operated by Giovanni Sartori remains a theoretical milestone. Sartori's theory is constructed in the continuation of the works of Maurice Duverger who used the number of parties as an evaluation criterion and provided an explanation as through the electoral system<sup>1</sup>. An important concept for Sartori, the party system is defined as "the system of interactions resulting from inter-party cooperation"<sup>2</sup>. The Italian author emphasizes the importance of the number of parties' criterion but recommends to "count intelligently", that is take into account the pertinence of the number. Sartori's study brings about a clarification of the different party systems, his essential delimitation residing in the demarcation of the different forms of multiparty and of the types of one-party systems (one-party, hegemonic party and predominant party). The two criteria for counting the parties in pluralist systems are: the coalition potential and the blackmail potential. Following this elucidation, the two coordinates of the Sartorian analysis are the format (the number of parties) and the mechanics (their interactions). This analytical scheme brings us to the establishment of seven classes of party systems: the one party, the hegemonic party system, the predominant party, the two-party system, the limited pluralism system, the extreme pluralism and the atomized pluralism<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, Sartori refines the Downs model and defines the political space using the ideological criteria<sup>4</sup> (on a left-center-right axis). This articulation of the political space is characterized by a centripetal competition (two-party, three-party and four-party system) or by a centrifugal competition (pluralist systems, more than five parties). The development of a party system presupposes though, not only the formation and the consolidation/structuring of a number of parties but also, in Sartorian terms, the creation of a political space<sup>5</sup>.

How can the Sartorian approach be applied to the study of the Romanian party system? For further detailing we need to consider the explanations provided by the researchers that focused on the particular space of post communist Central-Eastern Europe and moreover on the Romanian "case". This will permit to first verify the potential consolidation of the Romanian party system, in order to investigate afterward the hypothetical articulation of the Romanian party system around the *European issue*.

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<sup>1</sup> Maurice DUVERGER, *Les partis politiques*, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Giovanni SARTORI, *Parties and Party Systems*, Cambridge University Press London, New York, Melbourne, 1976, p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 125.

<sup>4</sup> "The broad hypothesis is, then, that the more the parties, the more their competition tends to spread along a linear, left-right type of space; that this is more surely the case the more a party system displays an ideological patterning; but that the space of competition may well be one-dimensional also in the segmented polities with low ideological focus, for a party stepping out of line into another dimension runs the risk of being left to play a solitary and, over time, losing game." (Anthony DOWNS, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper, New York, 1957, p. 342)

<sup>5</sup> M. Cotta considers that the political space plays a capital role at the dawn of democratization of the countries of post-communist Europe. Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship", in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Developments in Central and East European Politics 3*, Palgrave Macmillan Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2003, pp. 69-99/ p. 69.

*The Evolution of Party Systems in East Central Europe.  
A Preliminary Stabilization?*

Several approaches<sup>1</sup> can be identified in the analysis of party systems and parties of Central and Eastern post-communist Europe. Without wanting to present a generalizing or reductive analytical scheme, an evolutionary transnational analytical framework has been identified by a number of scholars<sup>2</sup>. The evolution of party systems and of parties can, in this manner, be enclosed in a more general scheme composed of three or even four phases of development/crystallization. The first stage of this process sees the formation of the opposition democratic fronts of large extent (Solidarnosc in Poland). Following this initial display / deployment of "umbrella movements" regrouping quite different tendencies and having more an apolitical / depoliticized penchant, a second stage is registered than by the implosion of these heteroclitic political forces and the formation, the consolidation of the opposition parties (scissions of these formations). In parallel, the ex./neo/ crypto-communists go through a reformulation process of adaptation to the new political reality / environment and assume with more or less success, social-democratic labels. From 1993-1995, the effective number of parties diminishes, the systemic alternation is already verified and the post-communist parties are consolidated. The obscure identity profiles of the beginning have been replaced by an evident programmatic crystallization of political parties and party systems in the *more advanced* countries, like Hungary and the Czech Republic, and at a lower level in Eastern countries like Bulgaria or Romania<sup>3</sup>. If for the Central European countries, a first systemic stabilization is acknowledged, the party systems of the Balkans are still questioned<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Bielasiak specifies the separation of scholars following two different approaches: *theorizing substantive cleavages* (the model of Lipset and Rokkan) and *process view* (the development of the post communist states), Jack BIELASIAK, "Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1997, pp. 23-44 / pp. 25-26; Pridham proposes an analytical scheme on six axes / comparative tests in order to measure the degree of democratic consolidation and of the emerging diversity of the regime trajectories. The six tests of democratization are: the diachronic test, the regional classification, the transnational variation, the quantitative approach / control list, the qualitative approach and the dynamic one. Geoffrey PRIDHAM, "Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Perspective", in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Developments...cit.*, pp. 269-289.

<sup>2</sup> Paul G. LEWIS, "Introduction and Theoretical Overview", in IDEM (ed.), *Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1996, pp. 1-19; Geoffrey PRIDHAM, Paul G. LEWIS, "Introduction: Stabilizing Fragile Democracies and Party System Development", in IDEM (eds.), *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies. Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, Routledge, London, New York, 1996 pp. 1-23; Jean-Michel DE WAELE, "L'émergence, l'organisation et les spécificités des partis politiques dans les pays candidats", *Pouvoirs*, no. 106, 2003, pp. 85-97; Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, "On the Internal Balance of Party Power: Party Organizations in New Democracies", *Party Politics*, vol. 6, no. 4, 2000, pp. 395-417; Tomas KOSTELECKY, *Political Parties after Communism*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press Washington DC, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 2002; Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship", *cit.*, pp. 69-99; Attila AGH, *The Politics of Central Europe*, Sage Publications Ltd, London, 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Paul G. LEWIS, "Political Parties", in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.) *Developments...cit.*, pp. 153-173.

<sup>4</sup> Attila AGH, "The Adolescence of East Central European Democracies as An Opportunity for Further Democratization", in IDEM (ed.), *Europeanization and Regionalisation: Hungary's preparation for EU Accession*, Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, Budapest, 2004, pp. 231-258 / p. 231.

Agh, in a Sartorian approach<sup>1</sup>, considers that the beginning of democratization of the post-communist political systems characterized by a polarized ideological pluralism is replaced thereafter, in a second stage of development by a limited or moderate pluralism<sup>2</sup>. Thus, the collapse of the communist regimes and the emergence of the pluralist political space engender an *overparticization* followed by an early *parliamentarization* of political competition<sup>3</sup>. Along these lines, in a first period, the new party systems bear an important burden of the recent communist past and this is translated in a weak implementation in society, by strong relations to the state<sup>4</sup> and in a continuity logic with the former regime at the elite level<sup>5</sup>. The post-communist parties have the tendency to present themselves more as *cadre parties*<sup>6</sup> than *mass parties*<sup>7</sup>. The function of intermediary agents between the state and society is badly accomplished by the new parties, they are weak bearers of the social interests<sup>8</sup> because they do not succeed in the articulation of precise and pointed discourses, using a more general, national approach<sup>9</sup>. On the other side,

<sup>1</sup> "Sartori refines the model of Duverger [...] we can consider him as the renovator of the institutional approach of the party systems". (Daniel Louis SEILER, *Les partis politiques*, Éditions Dalloz, Armand Colin, Paris, 2000, p. 199.)

<sup>2</sup> "Early freezing hypothesis". (Attila AGH, "The Adolescence ... cit.", p. 110.)

<sup>3</sup> Attila AGH, *The Politics of Central Europe*, London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1998; Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, "On the Internal Balance of Party Power...cit".

<sup>4</sup> Notwithstanding, Paul G. Lewis specifies that a similar emergence of the cartel-party as it was conceptualized by Katz and Mair ("Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party", *Party Politics*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-28) is less probable in East Central Europe. Paul G. LEWIS, "Introduction and Theoretical Overview", cit., pp. 1-19. See also the article by Sorina SOARE and Petia GUEORGIEVA, "Peut-on parler d'une cartellisation des partis politiques en Europe centrale et orientale? Les cas bulgare et roumain", in Antoine ROGER (ed.), *Des partis pour quoi faire?*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2003, pp. 103-120. In this sense, Attila Agh talks about an evolution of the parties of the area under scrutiny, from the party-movement towards the cartel-party. Attila AGH "The Adolescence of East Central European Democracies: Europeanization as an opportunity for further Democratization", in IDEM (ed.), *Europeanization and Regionalization: Hungary's preparation for EU accession*, Budapest, Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies, 2004, pp. 231-259

<sup>5</sup> Paul G. LEWIS, "Introduction and Theoretical Overview", cit.; Herbert KITSCHT, "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-communist Democracies. Theoretical Propositions", *Party Politics*, 1995 Vol. I, no.4, pp.447-472; Attila AGH, *The Politics of Central Europe*, cit.; Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party System after the Dictatorship: Coalitions, Alliances, Fusions and Splits during the Transition and Post-transition Stages", in Paul G. LEWIS, Geoffrey PRIDHAM (eds.), *Stabilising Fragile Democracies*, cit., pp. 69-100; Tom GALLAGHER, "The emergence of new party systems and transitions to democracy: Romania and Portugal compared", in IDEM, pp. 206-229

<sup>6</sup> This characteristic is perpetuated. Therefore DE WAELE ("L'émergence... cit"), considers that the majority of the present party organizations are more of the cadre type organized around personalities (elector parties) and having a limited number of members as well as a flawed organization. Parties are moreover weak bearer of interest inside societies marked by the last years disruptions.

<sup>7</sup> Lewis questions the applicability of the formulations of Duverger in East Central Europe. More fertile would be, in his sense, the formulation of Kirchheimer of catchall-party or that of Panebianco of electoral-professional party. Paul G. LEWIS (ed.), *Party Structure...cit.*, pp. 1-19.

<sup>8</sup> "To say that a party system becomes structured amounts to saying that it has reached a stage of consolidation at which it can, and actually does, perform a channelling function". Giovanni SARTORI, *Parties... cit.* p. 41

<sup>9</sup> Attila AGH, *The Politics of Central Europe*, cit.; Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party System after the Dictatorship: Coalitions, Alliances...cit.", pp. 69-100; Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, "On the Internal Balance of Party Power...cit."

the temporal distance that separates the new democracies of the previous experienced periods of democracy (as well as the different character of the regimes that allowed a higher or a lower degree of liberty) make an appeal to that period hard to achieve and prevent the clear formulation of opposition parties.

The first stabilization of East Central European party systems is not a commonly agreed scholar conclusion. Paul G. Lewis maintains his pessimist view as regarding this stabilization; thus, in his opinion, the Central-Eastern European party systems continue to be less consolidated and less defined, given their recent character/novelty<sup>1</sup>. The "new parties" maintain their institutional weakness and their limited societal implantation. Therefore the domination of the governmental and/or parliamentary party on the central organization of the party is confirmed. Furthermore, the majority of the new parties have more often an institutional origin (different attitudes concerning the institutional problems) than a societal origin<sup>2</sup>.

However, this highly extensive scheme does not fully apply to Bulgaria and even less to Romania, two countries that are consistently analyzed together with the Balkan countries (Albania and ex-Yugoslav countries). The two "exceptions" are thus, from the beginning, "altogether considered in a logic of continuation with the previous regime"<sup>3</sup> and see the "prolonged dominance of the communist establishment partially reformed and of a relatively weak democratic opposition"<sup>4</sup>. The systemic stabilization occurs only later, even if some authors still question the mere existence of a party system in these countries<sup>5</sup> and for whom the antidemocratic drifts are still possible<sup>6</sup>.

In order to acquire a more extensive understanding of the particular Romanian situation, we are turning now to the authors that have focused explicitly on the Romanian case. Several approaches of the study of the Romanian party system can be identified. For Daniel Barbu, the post-1989 Romanian political regime displays the characteristics of a *particracy*<sup>7</sup>; a form of government in which the parties hold the absolute monopoly of the political personnel and of the governmental policies. This type of political system draws its origins in the interwar period as well as in the communist regime. The constitutional pact instituted at the time of the systemic change has perpetuated this practice that presupposes "the natural

<sup>1</sup>Paul G. LEWIS, *EU Enlargement and Party Systems*, in "Draft Papers – EU Accession and National Parliaments", Budapest, 22-24 April 2004, organized by Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA)

<sup>2</sup>Societal origin as it is defined by Martin LIPSET, Stein ROKKAN (*Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*, New York, Free Press 1967). Thus, their center of interest would be the institutional aspect, the government arena and the Parliament. Moreover, these parties have the tendency to focus on short-term strategies, such as electoral mobilization more than the elaborated strategies of party mobilization. Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, "On the Internal Balance of Party Power...cit", pp. 396-397.

<sup>3</sup>Paul G. LEWIS, Geoffrey PRIDHAM (eds.), *Stabilising Fragile Democracies*, cit.

<sup>4</sup>Paul G. LEWIS, "Political Parties", in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Developments...cit.*, pp.153-173; Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party System after the Dictatorship: Coalitions, Alliances...cit."

<sup>5</sup>"In some cases it may well be queried whether inter-party relations have any systematic character at all" Paul G. LEWIS, *EU Enlargement...cit.*

<sup>6</sup>Tom GALLAGHER, "The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy: Romania and Portugal Compared", in Geoffrey PRIDHAM, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Stabilising Fragile Democracies...cit.*, pp. 206-229.

<sup>7</sup>Mauro CALISE, "The Italian Particracy: Beyond President and Parliament", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 109, no. 3, Special Issue, 1994, pp. 441-460.



and not functional capacity of representation of parties"<sup>1</sup>. Differing from other post-communist countries, Romania did not experience a round-table type of negotiated transition before the disappearance of the hegemonic party but an ex-post one. In this manner, the continuity at the level of communist elites was assured. The 1996 alternation wouldn't have signified other than the victory for the first time since 1920 of a party that did not organize the elections.

For Sorina Soare, the Romanian party system seems to have attained a rapid stabilization but a precarious one<sup>2</sup>. This stability of the party system operates at two levels. Thus, the political parties have been successful in establishing mature organizations, constructed essentially along the models of their occidental partners<sup>3</sup>. But the Romanian party system continues to deploy an "instable equilibrium" given the permeability of the sanitary cord set around the PRM and the perpetuation of the national isolation of the PSD. In what regards the applicability of the classical concepts to the Romanian political space, the author considers that the inter-regional comparisons are more feasible than those with the Occident. Soare suggests in this line for the Romanian case, the notion of *patchwork party* that designates "adaptations and functional, organizational and systemic selections"<sup>4</sup>.

### *The Parties as Analytical Units*

#### *Genetic Approach, Cleavage Theory*

At the second level of analysis of the party units, two approaches have been chosen so as to help in the deciphering of the particular Romanian configuration. Firstly attention will be drawn to the genetic approach<sup>5</sup> that presupposes the classification of political parties based on their creation on specific questions. In a second stance, the ideological convergence using the tool of political families is acknowledged.

Cleavages are tools designed to render an account of the emergence of divisions inside societies, conflicts that engender a specific positioning of the actors. In this sense the theory of Lipset and Rokkan<sup>6</sup> remains a fundamental theoretical milestone of the socio-historical studies of the development of political parties. Their cleavage theory is constructed in the logic of an extended historical perspective

<sup>1</sup> Daniel BARBU, *Republica absentă*, Nemira, București, 1999, p. 151.

<sup>2</sup> Sorina SOARE *Les partis politiques roumains après 1989*, Éditions de l'ULB, Bruxelles, 2004 (Ph.D. thesis manuscript), p. 316.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 317.

<sup>5</sup> Several typologies can be established in this sense. Paul G. Lewis identifies three types of parties following the communist breakdown: the socio-political movements (anti-communist fronts), the evolutions of the ex-communist parties and the historical parties. Paul G. LEWIS, "Political parties", in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Developments...cit.*, pp. 153-173/pp. 156-158; T. Kostecký identifies five types of parties in the Central-Eastern European countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland): communist and post-communist parties; the ex-satellite parties; the historical parties pre-communist; the parties emerged after the communist breakdown; the parties emerged at the implosion of dissident movements and finally the new parties without any political history. Tomáš KOSTELECKÝ, *Political Parties after Communism*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 2002, p. 76.

<sup>6</sup> Seymour Martin LIPSET, Stein ROKKAN, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction", in IDEM (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments...cit.*, pp. 1-64.

and allows a party decoding using four fundamental cleavages at the intersection of a functional/territory axis and three revolutions. The four cleavages are thus: the national revolution engenders two cleavages: the center versus periphery and state versus church; the industrial revolution sees the crystallization of another set of cleavages: rural/urban; owners/workers and a fifth cleavage is the direct result of the international revolution, creating an opposition between those who adhere to the ideals of the October Revolution and those who do not. The difficulty to apply this analytical scheme to the newly created post-communist states has been stressed by number of authors. I only want to remind the contributions of two *rokkanian* authors, D.L. Seiler and J-M. De Waele that have nuanced the famous societal cleavage theory by a fine-tuning to the special context of Eastern Europe and by submitting new axis of demarcation/confrontation.

Hence Seiler considers that the weight of the communist regime and the double process of democratization/adaptation to the market economy determine two particular cleavages<sup>1</sup>. A first territorial cleavage opposes the post-communists to the supporters of democracy. A second functional cleavage concerns the type of reform envisaged and sees the confrontation of the radical reform supporters (shock therapy) to the minimalists concerned by the social dimension of the economical changes. The Belgian author considers that the duration of these oppositions is temporarily limited and applies to the transition context only.

J.M. De Waele identifies the specificity of the Central-Eastern European context in relation to the original rokkanian conceptual map. Thus, only three of the original cleavages can be found in the regional party configuration. The center-periphery cleavage that presupposes the management of the minorities and state decentralization is identifiable given the multi-ethnic character of the post-communist states. The laic/religious cleavage is more problematic, because the question of secularity is extraneous to the region and the state/church separation is difficult in the orthodox countries. The important tradition of agrarian parties in the region confirms the presence of a rural/urban cleavage (but only on the rural side). The fourth cleavage owners/workers can not be retrieved because the economical transformations have provoked important disruptions in the social configuration, making difficult the identification of the "owners". Though, De Waele advances a different type of economic cleavage, adapted to the specific transitional context, an opposition concerning the amplexness and the character of the reform. A second cleavage particular to post-communist Europe is the one that opposes the authoritarian parties to the democratic parties. This cleavage would revive the traditional opposition between Occidental-ists and traditionalists and would translate nowadays the opposition between the supporters of a broader Europeanization and the defenders of the national interests (populist/nationalist parties). Finally a third cleavage opposes the communists to the anti-communists. For Romania two of the original cleavages are identified conjointly to the three cleavages specific to the economical and political transition.

For Cristian Preda, the Romanian political system is constructed around a negation of classic cleavages<sup>2</sup>. The post-communist regime provokes meanwhile two tensions. The communist-anti-communist tension is created on the fundamentals of the

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<sup>1</sup> Daniel-Louis SEILER, *Les partis politiques*, cit., p. 148.

<sup>2</sup> Cristian PREDA, "Les partis politiques dans le postcommunisme roumain", *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. III, no. 4, 2003, pp. 943-985/p. 957.

legitimacy of the traditionalists' camp as anti-communists. The second tension confronts the nationalists to the anti-nationalists and finds substance in the post-communist constitutional arrangement that defines Romania as a national state and not as a nation state<sup>1</sup>. Moreover the 2000 elections show the annulment of these two tensions, another sign of their artificial character. Preda concludes thus, that Romanian post-communism is constructed not around cleavages nor around durable tensions, displaying merely the characteristics of the functioning of the communist regime.

### *Ideological Convergence. Political Families*

A second approach tries to explain the character of post-communist parties by the means of a comparison with the Western Europe ideological configuration<sup>2</sup>. Paul G. Lewis considers that ideology and policy in Central-Eastern Europe are clearly marked by a Western influence<sup>3</sup>. Attila Agh observes that the applicability of certain Western *labels* (Liberal, Conservative) to the new space is problematic given their different signification and their confusing meaning in Western Europe<sup>4</sup>. Moreover, the obscure profiles of the beginnings render even more difficult this identification. Yet after a decade of official contacts, ruptures and changes, the post-communist parties seem compatible with the party organizations established in Western Europe. A confirmation of this compatibility is proven by the collaboration established through the party international and the European party federations as well as through the informal socializations of party leaders in the region<sup>5</sup>.

What about Romanian political parties? C. Vandermotten and P.M. Lockart establish a transnational map of electoral geography at the level of Central and Eastern Europe<sup>6</sup>. They identify, on the basis of three axis (economical, social and cultural), nine political families that structure the national spaces and can be retrieved at the regional level<sup>7</sup>. So as to gain a more in depth analysis of the Romanian case, I am

<sup>1</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 961. See also Daniel BARBU, "De l'ignorance invincible dans la démocratie", *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2001, pp. 19-28/pp. 22-23.

<sup>2</sup> The two approaches of the study of political parties: spatial competition and party ideology (elaborated by A. Downs and refined by Sartori) and the institutional approach (spiritual families of Von Beyme). For a clarification see, Alan WARE, *Political Parties and Political Systems*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 17-49. The political families identified by K. Von Beyme remain a reference: the Liberal and Radical parties, the Conservative parties, Socialists and Social-Democrats, Christian-Democrats, Communists, Agrarians, Regionalists and Ethnical, of Extreme-right end finally Ecologists. Klaus VON BEYME, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Aldershot Hants, England, Gower, 1985.

<sup>3</sup> The parties of the second wave of democratization are diffused ideologically and have political programs formulated in an "approximate" manner. (Paul G. LEWIS, "The Third Wave of Democracy in Eastern Europe", *Party Politics*, vol. 7, no. 5, 2001, pp. 543-565.

<sup>4</sup> Attila AGH, *The Politics of Central Europe*, cit., p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> Geoffrey PRIDHAM, "Patterns of Europeanization and Trans-national Party Co-operation: Party Development in Central and Eastern Europe", in Paul G. LEWIS (ed.), *Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-communist Europe. The First Decade*, Franck Cass Publishers, London, 2001, pp. 179-198/pp. 184-192; Paul G. LEWIS, "Political Parties", in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Developments...* cit., pp. 153-173.

<sup>6</sup> Christian VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo Medina LOCKHART, "La géographie électorale de l'Europe centre orientale", in J.-M. DE WAELE (éd.), *Partis politiques et démocratie en Europe centrale et orientale*, Éditions de l'ULB, Bruxelles, 2002, pp. 17-34.

<sup>7</sup> For Romania they are: the Ecologist family, the Communist family, the Social-Democratic, the Agrarian minimalist, the Liberal and Conservative, Minimalist and Modernist, an Agrarian maximal current, the Populist parties, the parties of defense of the particular interests and the

turning now to the refinement of Vandermotten & Lockart mapping, suggested by Cristian Preda. The Romanian author identifies the nine families and sketches a brief portrait of each one<sup>1</sup>. I shall refer only to the political families that comprise the six-case studies analyzed by the present research. The Social-Democrats have an imported identity obtained through the recognition offered by the Socialist International (SI), they form the most important political family. The Liberal family, fragmented by the never-ending conflicts encompasses an important ideological diversity. The PNȚCD occupies its place inside the family of Agrarians, Christian populists/identity right. The national-populists have a special profile combining nostalgia in economical terms and extremism towards the minorities (PRM). And finally the UDMR is the only minority formation to have surpassed the threshold on its own.

### *The Influence of the External Constraint*

#### *Europeanization: Definition of Terms and of the Domains of Influence*

What is in this context, the role played by the external factor<sup>2</sup>, that is Europe and the process it deploys in order to integrate the ex-communist countries to its economical, political, social, cultural space? Europeanization has acquired, in Central and Eastern European countries a particular significance, being associated with liberal democracy and gaining though, a symbolic value (the democratic conditionality) in conformity with the desire of the ex-communist countries to reconnect with the European politics, "to return to Europe"<sup>3</sup>.

First, it is necessary to specify what Europeanization means. A task that proves to be quite difficult given the absence of a commonly agreed definition and this in spite of the wealth of scientific studies dealing with this specific question. In order to better define its domain/range and so as to avoid confusions, it could be useful to demarcate/differentiate/distinguish it from other concepts that are often associated with it<sup>4</sup>. Hence, Europeanization is not synonym to the European integration. The European integration conceived as a double process of "delegation of policy competences to the supranational level in order to achieve particular policy results" and "the establishment of a new set of political institutions with executive, legislative and judicial powers"<sup>5</sup> is though *the source of*

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parties of the minorities' interests. Christian VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo Medina LOCKHART, "La géographie électorale...cit.", pp. 18-24.

<sup>1</sup> Cristian PREDA, "Le système politique roumain après quatre élections", *Transitions*, vol. XLIII, no. 1, 2002, pp. 127-147.

<sup>2</sup> For an alternative approach see the analysis of Antoine Roger who uses the theory of imported models outlined by Bertrand Badie and distinguishes between three functions in the logic of action of political parties: a rupture function, a demonstration function and an adjustment function. Antoine ROGER, "L'incidence de la contrainte externe sur le positionnement des partis politiques en Europe centrale et orientale", in Jean Michel DE WAELE (éd.), *Partis politiques...cit.*, pp. 173-186.

<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey PRIDHAM, "Patterns of Europeanization...cit.", p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> Following the approach proposed by Claudio M. RADAELLI, "Whiter Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change", *European Integration Online Papers EIOP*, vol. 4, no. 8, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Klaus H. GOETZ, Simon HIX, "Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems", in IDEM (eds.), *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Party Systems*, London, Franck Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 1-26/p. 3.

*Europeanization*<sup>1</sup>. Europeanization is neither convergence with European norms (since it can also bring about divergence) it is neither harmonization, nor political integration. We can thus advance a preliminary minimal definition: *Europeanization designates the effects engendered by the European integration in the member states of the EU.*

So as to extend our comprehension of this "problematic" concept we will present in what follows, the clarifications brought about by Olsen, Radaelli or Ladrech. J. Olsen attempts an organization of the scientific debate by a demarcation of the range of the concept, considering more useful to define its utility in order to better understand "the dynamics of the evolutionary European politics" rather than seek *the definition*. Europeanization is thus not "a unique process but a *sui generis* phenomenon used in order to compare the European dynamics with the dynamics of other governance systems". The different domains concerned by Europeanization are, in his sense, the changes in external territorial boundaries (enlargement), the development of institutions of governance at the European level, central penetration of national and sub national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory (relations with non European states), the political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe<sup>2</sup>.

For Radaelli<sup>3</sup>, in a Sartorian approach<sup>4</sup>, it is more important to establish the conceptual delineation in order to avoid the potential risks<sup>5</sup> presented by a tool not thoroughly defined/delimited. Thus, the author first revises the different definitions and the problems presented by each one in order to present his own definition. Having as a starting point the definition of R. Ladrech<sup>6</sup>, Radaelli identifies Europeanization as being the

"processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies"<sup>7</sup>.

Radaelli's definition can be applied, as he notes, both to the member states of the EU as to the other countries and it refers both to organizations and individuals. Following the distinction introduced by Morlino<sup>8</sup> between the polity Europeanization and the Europeanization of public policy, the domains affected by the Europeanization in the sense of Radaelli, are divided amid the macro-national political structures (institutions, public administration, inter-governmental relations, legal structure, the representation structures and the normative and cognitive structures) and the public policy.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Johan P. OLSEN, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", *ARENA Working Papers*, WP01/2, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Claudio M. RADAELLI, "Whiter Europeanization?...cit".

<sup>4</sup> Giovanni SARTORI, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. LXIV, no. 4, December 1970, pp. 1033-1053.

<sup>5</sup> "Concept misformation", "conceptual stretching" and "digression".

<sup>6</sup> Robert LADRECH, "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1, 1994, pp. 69-88.

<sup>7</sup> Claudio M. RADAELLI, "Whiter Europeanization?...cit".

<sup>8</sup> Leonardo MORLINO, "Europeanization and Representation in Two Europes. Local Institutions and National Parties", Paper given to the conference on Multi-Party Systems: "Europeanization and the Reshaping of National Political Representation", European University Institute, Florence, 16-18 December 1999.

R. Ladrech<sup>1</sup> acknowledges the different definitions given to the term of Europeanization so as to conclude in his own particular vision focused on the specific impact on national parties. Europeanization labels thus, "a process of adaptation and adjustment by parties to changed conditions within their domestic political systems". The definition that Radaelli gives (and that of Ladrech) presents itself in a logic of "adaptation of the responses by the actors to a changed environment" in comparison with the studies on Europeanization focusing above all on the logic of institutional change<sup>2</sup> and of the public policy adaptation<sup>3</sup>.

This definition<sup>4</sup> is the most appropriate to the specific approach followed throughout this research because it entails explicitly the influence of Europeanization on political parties. It refers moreover to the institutional level as well as to the agreed upon convictions, it is not limited to the organizational level, but takes into account the individual actors and their choices and has a range of applicability to the non-member states of EU.

### *Europeanization of Political Parties*

As R. Ladrech observed, the scholarly works on Europeanization have focused for the most part, on the influences European integration exerts on the institutions and on the public policy and to a quite lesser extent, on the effects it entails on political parties. The study of the Europeanization of political parties consists of two coordinates; on one side there is the analysis of the transnational cooperation (as well as the cooperation at the level of the delegations to the European Parliament) and on the other side the European orientation (at the policy level) of the national party families or of the national party systems. The present study is concerned mostly by this second aspect, the internalization first, by political parties of the European coordinate and the ensuing articulation of the Romanian party system in relation to this European coordinate.

Peter Mair analyzes the impact Europeanization exerts on national party systems of the EU member states. In the Sartorian terms of *format* (the number of parties that compete and the new parties created with a specific reference to the European integration) and of *mechanics* (their interaction measured through their stance on European related issues), Mair concludes that none of the subsequent changes in the dynamics and form of party systems of the EU member states can be directly related to the impact of Europeanization. The author finds nevertheless a number of indirect effects of this process; for instance the constraints upon the maneuverability of governmental policies and the increasing notion of irrelevance of conventional politics.

In considering the Europeanization of political parties as singular entities, Ladrech identifies several levels of analysis: the policy change at the programmatic level on a double axis: quantitative and qualitative; the organizational change (the

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<sup>1</sup> Robert LADRECH, "Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards A Framework for Analysis", *Party Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2002, pp. 389-403

<sup>2</sup> Johan P. OLSEN, "The Many Faces...cit."

<sup>3</sup> The definitions of Caporaso, Green-Cowles and Risse (quoted by Radaelli, Olsen and Ladrech), that of Andersen and Eliassen or Borzel (quoted by Ladrech) and so on.

<sup>4</sup> Firstly elaborated by Claudio M. RADAELLI, "Whiter Europeanization?...cit" and confirmed later on by Robert LADRECH, "Europeanization and Political Parties...cit."

statutes); the models of party competition (a pro/anti-European stance); the party-government relations and the relations beyond the national party system (transnational cooperation). Nevertheless the changes induced by Europeanization mentioned by Ladrech are limited to the EU member-states; no reference is made to the candidate countries.

*Europeanization and the Central  
and Eastern European Countries*

An important part of the literature on Central and Eastern European countries focuses exclusively on democratization<sup>1</sup> even though more specific analysis directions can be found such as the study of the development and the stabilization of party systems. Central and Eastern Europe receives therefore less attention in what regards the modifications induced by Europeanization and even less if we refer to Bulgaria and Romania, "the great absents of the analytical inquiry". The studies on Europeanization in the CEECs<sup>2</sup> refer especially at the level of national politics, to the changes in public policy<sup>3</sup>, to the different mechanisms used in the process of administrative reform<sup>4</sup>, or to a less significant extent to the cooperation established through the enlargement process with the European institutions.

Nevertheless, studying the influence that the integration process and its corollary Europeanization produce at the level of national politics and policies in Central-Eastern European countries is a much more fruitful analysis for a number of authors. For H. Grabbe the influence of EU in the CEECs is larger than in the member-states because of the political and economical prerequisites established for this enlargement process<sup>5</sup>. Adhesion to the EU demands a profound transformation of laws and institutions, of policies and orientations of a country<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore EU has become an actor of party competition, the pressures of the Union interact with the national debates on politics and governance. An "appeal to Europe" continues

<sup>1</sup> See for example: Paul G. LEWIS, "The Third Wave...cit."; Geoffrey PRIDHAM, "EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-communist States – Formality and Reality", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 3, 2002 pp. 953-973; IDEM, "Theorising About Democratisation and Lessons from Eastern Europe", *Annual Conference of the Japanese Political Science Association*, Kyoto, Japan 2-4 October 1998; IDEM, "EU Accession and Domestic Politics: Policy Consensus and Interactive Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe", in Cameron ROSS, *Perspectives on the Enlargement of the EU*, Brill Academic Publishers, 2002, pp. 49-74; Peter MAIR, Jan ZIELONKA, "Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged EU", *West European Politics*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2002 pp. 1-18.

<sup>2</sup> CEECs, abbreviation for Central and Eastern European countries.

<sup>3</sup> Anna GWIAZDA, "Europeanization in candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe", *EPIC workshop* in Florence EUI 19-22 September 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Dimitris PAPADIMITROU, "Exporting Europeanization: EU Enlargement, The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Eastern Europe", *EPIC workshop* in Turin 22-27 April 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Heather GRABBE, "The Implications of EU Enlargement", in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Developments...cit.*, pp. 253-266.

<sup>6</sup> The process of adhesion puts pressure on three series of relations: the relation between the executive and the legislative, the emergence of a team of privileged in the executive and the relation between the central government and the local government. EU plays a role in several aspects of the political life of the CEECs. In particular EU has shaped large part of the domains of public policy, especially the market regulation and boundaries control. Moreover it has affected the development of governance requiring a high degree of centralization of several aspects related to the elaboration of new policies. Heather GRABBE, "The Implications...cit.", pp. 258-259.

to be a constant feature of the national debate, all the parts and all the political parties make this appeal. However, the process of European integration has become a "political football" in the party competition and the diversity of the member states offer several different examples for the politicians throughout the political spectrum, examples that offer them guidance/support (diffuse Europeanization in the sense of Pridham). Furthermore, according to K. Henderson, the questions related to the EU are exploited in a much greater measure in the Central and Eastern European countries in agreement to the national agenda. This occurs since the accession process has a greater impact on the legislative and on the foreign policy<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, Henderson confirms the conclusion of P. Mair, "Europe imposes severe constraints on the policy maneuverability of governments and on the parties that make up those governments"<sup>2</sup> and constraints thus their freedom of action. In the same line, S. Hix and K.H. Goetz<sup>3</sup> consider that the European integration and its effect Europeanization can better interact in the CEECs because of their interconnection with the process of triple transition: democratization, liberalization and privatization<sup>4</sup>.

Withal, more recent studies lift the "veil of ignorance" in what concerns the particular area under scrutiny. Thus, Paul G. Lewis prolongs the reasoning of Peter Mair applying it to the new eight EU member states<sup>5</sup>. Considering that the analysis Mair proposed is restrictive, Lewis accentuates the more interesting character represented, in his opinion by the *indirect effects* of Europeanization. Consequently "it is clear that Europeanization has been a major factor in the development of party systems in Central Europe", what is more difficult, in Lewis' opinion is to acknowledge the impact of the EU enlargement. Lewis focuses hence on this aspect taking as variables the electoral results and the accession referendums to the EU of 2003. Except Poland that deploys through the presence of the League of Polish Families (LPR, essentially anti-integrationist) a direct effect of Europe on the party system, the direct effect of European integration on regional party systems is limited. However, the indirect effects on the party systems (the manner in which the parties interact and their institutional integrity, the way in which they relate to their electorate) identified by Lewis represent the major result of this process (i.e. enlargement).

G. Pridham studies the influence Europeanization exerts on party systems/parties of CEECs considering that "Europeanization and EU integration influence in a major measure Central and Eastern Europe, favoring political stability and the development of party systems"<sup>6</sup>. Yet, Pridham focuses on Europeanization through transnational cooperation<sup>7</sup> of political parties deeming/estimating that

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Peter MAIR, "The Limited Impact...cit.", p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Klaus H. GOETZ, Simon HIX, "Introduction: European Integration...cit.", p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> In a recent work Goetz refers to the ten new EU member-states but focuses on the effects perpetrated by Europeanization on the polity (state institutions) and on the public policy; as regards politics (electoral behavior, parties and party systems) the author only takes into account the development of Euroscepticism, "uncertain phenomena given the fluidity of party systems". Klaus H. GOETZ, *The New Members States and the EU*, in *Draft Papers*, "EU Accession and National Parliaments", Budapest 22-24 April 2004, Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA).

<sup>5</sup> The new eight EU (from Central and Eastern Europe) member states beginning the 1st May 2004 are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey PRIDHAM, "EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy...cit.", pp. 953-954.

<sup>7</sup> Pridham places Romania in the Balkans and considers that transnational relations established with this area are obfuscated by their "uncertain transitions". Geoffrey PRIDHAM, "Patterns of Europeanization...cit.", p. 194.



this approach is more fruitful than the simple observation of ideological convergences (or not-). In this manner, in the case of CEECs Europeanization through transnational cooperation<sup>1</sup> has acquired a broader meaning with a distinct historical edge emphasizing the desire of these countries to reintegrate into Europe (historical mission with a cultural or modernizing message). Europeanization, in Pridham's sense can be identified under different forms: on one side there is a diffuse sense of pursuit of models of party development (the case of reformed communists) and on the other side, a more specific Europeanization at different levels: *identity and ideology, programs, organization, electoral policies and personnel*.

Agh considers that the processes of Europeanization (i.e. the process of adhesion to the EU in this case) have been determining factors in the modeling of the new political systems<sup>2</sup>. Using the Sartorian approach of party representation<sup>3</sup> Agh concludes that the political parties of Central and Eastern Europe as major actors of the political space are more necessarily oriented towards an Europeanization of their constituencies. Thus the party paradox in Central and Eastern Europe is such that parties support Europeanization more enthusiastically and unambiguously than their constituencies<sup>4</sup> because of a double constraint, their need of internal and external legitimacy. In spite of their openly manifested willingness, parties have been incapable until now to understand European politics and this has prevented a clear formulation of detailed European policies.

More specific approaches dealing with the political parties of the CEECs and their relation to the European integration have been used by L. Neumayer or A. Battory. Neumayer<sup>5</sup> analyzes the use of European references by Hungarian, Czech and Polish parties and concludes that the "European thematic constitutes a political resource...and a source of political capital of an external nature capable of being converted in a source of internal capital with a growing profitability"<sup>6</sup>. Battory focuses on the Hungarian system and its articulations in relation to the European integration<sup>7</sup>. Her conclusions are that the seeming consensus of Hungarian political elites and of Hungarian political parties hides different orientations linked to the particular ideology of each one and to the successive modifications undergone by the parties.

### *Euroscepticism, Some Clarifications*

The development of the literature on Euroscepticism, essentially focused on the fifteen EU member states with an increasing applicability on Eastern and Central European politics (new member states and candidate countries), is to be integrated in the logic of analysis of the influence Europeanization bears on politics as

<sup>1</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 183.

<sup>2</sup> Attila AGH, "The Adolescence...cit."

<sup>3</sup> "For Sartori, parties are not simple 'conversion mechanisms' but have their own way of life, being autonomous political actors...Parties appear as specific actors with a particular type of political profile and oriented towards the electoral behaviour of the general public." (Attila AGH, "The Adolescence...cit.", p. 237.)

<sup>4</sup> Attila AGH, "The Adolescence...cit."

<sup>5</sup> Laure NEUMAYER, "L'impact de la future adhésion à l'Union Européenne sur les structures politiques des pays d'Europe Centrale: l'usage de la thématique européenne dans les compétitions politiques", in Antoine ROGER (éd.), *Des partis pour quoi faire?*, cit., pp. 123-141.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 141.

<sup>7</sup> Agnes BATTORY, "Attitudes to Europe", *Party Politics*, vol. 8, no. 5, 2002, pp. 525-539.

a complementary study to the research on the Europeanization phenomena and its effects on policies and especially on public policy.

Thus to the comparative study of Taggart on Euroscepticism in Western Europe<sup>1</sup> has been added an analysis by Taggart and Szczerbiak<sup>2</sup> dealing with the ten Central and Eastern European countries candidate to accession to the EU<sup>3</sup>. Euroscepticism, "already an integral part of party systems in Central and Eastern Europe"<sup>4</sup> is the "possible or qualified opposition as well as the direct rejection and the complete opposition to the process of European integration"<sup>5</sup>. The distinction introduced by the two authors between *hard-Euroscepticism*<sup>6</sup> and *soft-Euroscepticism*<sup>7</sup> has contributed to the further detailing of party positions, until then considered on a very limitative axis of a pro/anti- integration stance. *Soft Euroscepticism* is subdivided into two categories: policy Euroscepticism and Euroscepticism of the national interest<sup>8</sup>. Following this binary scheme the authors conclude that there is no connection between the position of a party on the right-left axis and its vision on EU and the European integration. If in Western Europe Euroscepticism is found throughout the political spectrum in Central and Eastern Europe it is most often the appanage of right parties, and particularly of extreme-right parties with the specification that government parties express openly their Eurosceptic stance (ODS in Czech republic and FIDESZ in Hungary). Furthermore, Taggart and Szczerbiak note that there is no correlation between the level of Euroscepticism of the population and that of the political parties as well as the absence of relation between the advancement of the negotiation of accession and the increase in the level of Euroscepticism. The larger presence of *soft Euroscepticism* in spite of *hard Euroscepticism*, (given the broad consensus of political elites concerning the integration to the EU, there are less chances to see the deployment of total and unconditional rejection of this political project) and the absence of anti-EU parties, created essentially on European questions, differentiate the space of Central and Eastern Europe of its occidental neighbors, more advanced in the contestation.

Considering the criteria of evaluation used by Taggart (and consequently by Taggart and Szczerbiak) as being too encompassing/imprecise and insufficiently defined, P. Kopecky and C. Mudde suggest an alternative analytical scheme for the interpretation of the attitudes of the political parties of the candidate countries

<sup>1</sup> Paul TAGGART, "A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems", *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 33, 1998, pp. 363-388.

<sup>2</sup> Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, "Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe", *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 43, 2004, pp. 1-27. (As mentioned by the authors, the article has been submitted to the publication in July 2001.)

<sup>3</sup> Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

<sup>4</sup> Paul TAGGART, Aleks SZCZERBIAK, "Contemporary Euroscepticism...cit.", p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Paul TAGGART, "A Touchstone of Dissent...cit.", p. 366.

<sup>6</sup> Hard Euroscepticism defines the complete rejection of the entire European project: political and economical integration. The term presupposes also the opposition towards joining the EU or the renunciation to the status of member of the EU.

<sup>7</sup> Soft Euroscepticism designates the possible opposition (unpredictable), qualified towards the European integration.

<sup>8</sup> Euroscepticism of the national interest implies the use of rhetoric of defense of the national interest in the context of debates on the EU. It can also be used in order to reestablish the national electoral support.

(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)<sup>1</sup>. On the basis of the distinction introduced by D. Easton between the forms of political support<sup>2</sup>, Kopecky and Mudde differentiate between the *diffuse* support (for the general ideas of the EU and the European integration) and the *specific* support (for the practices of the European integration and for the EU as it is as well for the manner in which it develops). Thus, the diffuse support would separate the Europhiles from the Europhobes<sup>3</sup>. Whereas the specific support demarcates the EU-optimists<sup>4</sup> of the EU-pessimists<sup>5</sup>. This brings the two authors to the definition of four ideal categories of the positions of political parties in relation to Europe: Euro-enthusiasts (Europhiles and EU-optimists), Euro-skeptics (Europhobes and EU-pessimists), Euro-rejects (Europhobes and EU-pessimists) and Euro-pragmatists (Europhobes and EU-optimists). This typology is thereafter applied to the four Central European countries. Accordingly the two authors conclude that "the EU is slowly but steadily becoming relevant political issue in Eastern Central Europe"<sup>6</sup>. Kopecky and Mudde acknowledge the presence of an important number of Europhiles parties and on another side the political irrelevance of Euro-rejects parties as well as the limited number of Euro-pragmatists parties. The conclusion of the authors is thus that ideology is the crucial factor in explaining the arrangement of political parties on questions related to the European integration. Hence, they oppose the conclusions of Taggart and Szczerbiak that considered the positioning in relation to the European question to be a strategic question linked to the place occupied by the party in the party system (peripheral or governmental party, opposition party or party in power<sup>7</sup>).

The subsequent precisions provided by the research of the two groups of authors are helpful in our inquiry of the Romanian political party configuration. We will thus be able to discern the potential Euroscepticism of the Romanian political parties, given their reluctance in presenting themselves on a Euro-skeptical stance.

## *A Romanian Analysis*

### *Theoretical Conclusions and Methodological Specifications*

In search for an answer to the scientific assumptions presented at the outset of this study, a brief theoretical framing was imagined. This theoretical outline started with the presentation of the milestones of systemic analysis in post-communist Europe. A first systemic stabilization is registered by the researchers both at the regional level as well as the particular case of Romania is concerned. Secondly, an overview of the main theories of political parties as specific analytical

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<sup>1</sup> Peter KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, "The Two Sides of Euro-scepticisms", *European Union Politics*, vol. 3, no. 3, 2002, pp. 297-326.

<sup>2</sup> David EASTON, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> The Europhobes don't support the general ideas of the European integration; they can be nationalists, socialists or isolationists.

<sup>4</sup> EU optimists believe in EU as it is and as it develops.

<sup>5</sup> EU-pessimists do not support the EU as it is or are pessimistic in what concerns its future.

<sup>6</sup> Peter KOPECKY, Cas MUDDE, "The Two Sides of Euro-scepticisms", *cit.*, p. 319.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*.

subjects has been an introduction to the particular analytical concern of our study. The research continued with a revision of the main contributions to the theory of cleavages that portray the apparition of new parties on a confrontation axis. Consequently, Romania is depicted as the scene of a series of cleavages. This opposition on particular questions is in our opinion surpassed by the logic of articulation of our six case-studies on the European problematic. Therefore the present study will regroup the six parties on the basis of their creation on specific questions (genetic approach). On yet another side, the gradual ideological convergence operated by the new parties in Central and Eastern Europe was taken into account. The evolution observed in the last decade is confirmed for Romania. Finally the landmarks of the studies on Europeanization were presented, with a particular penchant on the Europeanization of political parties and moreover in the specific context of Central and Eastern Europe. The lack of consistent studies dealing with the Romanian situation (the Euroscepticism studies let aside) motivates the present research that will try to further analyze the influence exerted by "Europe" in the articulation of the Romanian party system and of its actors.

The present analysis is restricted at the ideological level (in spite of other domains disposed to a European influence as the political personnel, the electoral results, the parliamentary positions etc.). An analysis of the party programs and party statutes will be pursued so as to verify the changes of the ideological/identity party profile provoked by the envisaged Romanian accession and to render an account of the potentially different visions on the process of European integration. The clarifications of Taggart & Szczerbiak and Kopecky & Mudde will be taken into account in order to detect/discover the Eurosceptical potential of the Romanian political parties, to go beyond the seeming Europhilia.

The present study is thus confronted with two important limitations. First, the party programs and the internal regulations as specified by the statutes can procure but a limited/sectorial image of the party ideology, of its particular vision<sup>1</sup>. The starting point is though a negative *a priori*. The second methodological constraint is linked to the contemporarily character of this analysis, the research deploys in the present, allowing but a limited capacity to step back and acknowledge the facts; things change impetuously in an unstable political landscape and most of all in an electoral year (as it is the case of PRM). Hence, after the stage décor was planted we can at this time turn our attention to the study of the actors. Henceforth the positions of the Romanian political parties and the articulation of their visions inside the party system in relation to the question of Europeanization will be scrutinized.

### *The European Question at the Systemic Level*

At this point it is conveniently to recall the main research question: *What role does "Europe" play in the construction/structuring of a party system in post-communist*

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<sup>1</sup> "Party programmes embrace only certain aspects of a party's ideology. A program is a party's public face; it is what the party says it wants to do. It is constructed to attract voters, but there are many aspects of a party's beliefs, values or ethos, which may not be stated in its manifesto. Unlike the classic left/right spectrum, populism and nationalism are dimensions that are far more likely to be revealed by a party's reactions to events than in any formal statement of intentions. The analysis of party programmes is necessarily an analysis that is biased towards uncovering the left/right dimension rather than other ones." (Alan WARE, *Political Parties and Political Systems*, cit., p. 20.)

Romania? For further detailing two sub-questions were stated at the outset of this study: 1) *How is the Romanian party system articulated in relation to the European question?* 2) *In what measure does "Europe" structure the political debate in post-communist Romania?* In order to answer this series of questions, the present research is situated in the continuation of the findings of Peter Mair<sup>1</sup> for the EU member-states in what regards the indirect effects (letting aside the *single issue parties* formed with the explicit purpose of defending European questions<sup>2</sup>). Thus the first systemic assumption is that: *There is no Europeanization of the Romanian party system (no direct effect)*. The considerations of Paul G. Lewis (2004) and his refinement of Mair's analysis in relation to the indirect effects of Europeanization (through the integrationist process) facilitate the establishment of a second research hypothesis: *The European issue is adopted and interiorized by the principal political parties, both at the systemic level and at the individual level. It is nonetheless a secondary coordinate if not concealed, it doesn't represent a fundamental topic but a commonly accepted matter*.

Hence in order to respond to the main research question, the impact of "Europe" and of the European integration process in the articulation of the actors has to be acknowledged. At a first glance the pro-European unanimity is evident. The parties under scrutiny have all signed the Declaration of Snagov of 1995<sup>3</sup> that accompanied Romania's request for the accession to the EU, and later on the 2000 Declaration of Snagov<sup>4</sup> that stated the economic objectives necessary for the Romanian European integration. These political agreements were supported by the civil society, by the representatives of the parliamentary parties, by the government together with the Romanian president and the patriarch of Romania. In order to go beyond this general accord at the systemic level an in-depth investigation of the parties' assembling can be imagined by means of an analysis of the logic of coalitions, political alliances and party fusions.

To begin with, for the opposition/historic parties plus the UDMR (even if it participated in the 1996-2000 government) it is an ideological option, a shared will/determination to reconnect with the glorious past, the inter-war period. After the 1989 *revolution* the discourse of the principal political leaders of the opposition parties carries an intellectual, cultural project with historical valences<sup>5</sup>, under the generalized appeal all throughout Central-Eastern Europe of the "return to Europe". Europe is, as Daniel Barbu observed<sup>6</sup>, represented in the post-revolutionary Romanian imaginary not so much as the common economical project (with the

<sup>1</sup> Peter MAIR, "The Limited Impact...cit."

<sup>2</sup> Cristian Preda makes an in-depth analysis of this aspect and concludes that the exclusive and sectorial reference to Europe is assumed only by two parties in the period of 1990-1992 (the two parties do not participate at the subsequent elections of 1996 and 2000): Partidul Casa Română a Europei Democratice/The Party of the Romanian House of Democratic Europe which obtains in 1990, 390 votes in the Chamber of Deputies and 553 votes at the Senate; Mișcarea pentru Integrare Europeană/The Movement for the European Integration wins 1371 popular votes in 1992 in the Chamber of Deputies. Cristian PREDĂ, "Naissance d'un clivage européen en Roumanie?", Colloque "L'Union Européenne en débat: visions d'Europe centrale et orientale", Nancy, 10-11 April 2003.

<sup>3</sup> National Strategy of preparation for the accession of Romania to the European Union, 21 June 1995.

<sup>4</sup> Declaration of Snagov of the political leaders 16 March 2000 concerning the "National Strategy of economical development of Romania on the medium term".

<sup>5</sup> Daniel BARBU, *Șapte teme de politică românească*, Antet, București, 1997, p. 212.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 213.

important extension of the competences of the Union at the occasion of the Maastricht European council of 1991) but foremost as an idyllic space of which Romanian were separated by the mischance of history. The discourses are thus at the beginning, marked by this mandatory allusion, the party programs include this coordinate bearing on an alternative option, the integration in Europe, a synonym of democracy and liberty. The European political project is clarified later on (around the year 2000, 2004 for the PRM). The permanence of the recurrent motive of the 'return to Europe' is perpetuated to the present. In a general manner, the Romanian political parties use the European coordinate as a leitmotiv of their capability of dealing with the destiny of the country; in the terms of D. Barbu's analysis, the European integration stands for the lacking societal project elaborated by the citizens.

*The Democratic Convention of Romania.* The CDR is the "alliance of parties and formations that have the vocation of democracy, and which opts for the profound change of Romania...and its re-integration in the European circuit". The democratic opposition is then legitimized by its strong pro-European positioning. CDR pronounced, as early as 1992<sup>1</sup>, in favor of the "European integration of Romania in all the European organizations"<sup>2</sup> and wanted to offer Romania "its natural place in Europe and the participation with full rights to the process of European integration" that "its geographical position, its historical and national traditions and its accomplishments" grant it. Thus, the most important party alliance of the democratic opposition in the period of 1990-2000<sup>3</sup>, CDR presents itself as an alternative political project to the overwhelming power of the PSDR. CDR regrouped the historical parties together with ecologist formations and organizations of the civil society. Implicitly associated with democracy and the country's opening towards the Western space, CDR is in power starting with 1996. Its political victory is saluted by the occident as the sign of the definitive democratic, pro-Western orientation of Romania. The echoing disputes inside the coalition and the internal policy failures will lead to its dissolution. The breakdown of the CDR will facilitate the affirmation of the party identities until then regrouped in one large encompassing unitary political alliance. On the other side, the disappearance of the CDR provokes the annulment of the logic of ex/anti-communist and allows a new political articulation. In 2000, only the PNȚCD will initiate an alliance process bearing the same anti-communist message, CDR 2000. This political project proved to be a failure, CDR 2000 doesn't succeed in entering the Parliament.

Another political project bearing an alternative message still in relation to the PSD is *Justice and Truth (Dreptate și Adevăr – D.A.)*. In 2003 PNL and PD form together D.A., an electoral alliance that safeguards the ideological characteristics of the two parties (liberalism and social-democracy). D.A. is legitimized also by the desire of the two parties to accomplish the European integration. Therefore, among the fundamental options of the alliance there is the statement of intent related to the European integration: "the complete integration of Romania in the

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<sup>1</sup> "Platform-program of the Democratic Convention of Romania to get the country out of the crisis through the LAW, the TRUTH, RECONCILIATION and REFORM (August 1992)", in Dan PAVEL, Iulia HUIU, *Nu putem reuși decât împreună. O istorie analitică a CDR, 1989-2000*, Polirom, Iași, 2003, pp. 529-555.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 554 (Chapter VII. "Romania – A European State").

<sup>3</sup> Another important coalition is USD (Social Democratic Union), the alliance of the PD and the PSDR (Romanian Social-Democrat Party, a historic party) 1995-1998.

Euro-Atlantic economical and security structures. The European (Euro-Atlantic) integration will be accomplished by the promotion of the national interest"<sup>1</sup>.

As Daniel Barbu observed, the PCR (The Communist Romanian Party) suddenly disappeared at the moment of the popular uprising of December 1989. Due to the lack of an elaborated, thoroughly documented study of the present Romanian party organizations and to the absence of research dealing with the highly extensive communist organization (in December 1989 the PCR had more than four million party members that "evaporated" rapidly) the FSN and its subsequent forms (FDSN, PDSR, PSD) are generally nominated as the true continuators of the PCR. The FSN regroups *a priori* the highest number of the second echelon nomenclature members and displays a noncommunist character in what is related to its policy orientations and political actions. As the concern of the present study is limited to the ideological position of the political actors and by the declarative level this assumption is meant only to broaden the scientific perspective.

For the *post/ex-communists* it would be more of a strategic, pragmatic choice bearing on the guaranteeing of a favorable place for Romania in the concert of Western nations. The options of the Iliescu regime (there is a constant association between the party and its charismatic leader) undergo a gradual reshaping and from a secondary ideological question, the European issue wins a more important place in the party ideology (FSN-FDSN-PDSR-PSD). The doubtful reactions of the first FSN/PDSR governments relating to internal events (the successive minors attacks on the capital Bucharest in order to suppress the democratic opposition and to replace the prime-minister) and external ones (attitudes towards the Milosevic regime at the beginning of the 1990s<sup>2</sup> or the theories on the defense of the national interest threatened by the neighboring country Hungary and the positions towards the Magyar minority and its political formation, the UDMR) prevail on the declared Romanian option for a European reintegration. Additionally the FDSN/PDSR allies with the nationalist parties in the 1992-1996 Parliament, collaboration that is known in the recent historical memory under the denomination of the "Red Quadrilateral"<sup>3</sup>. Thus its pro-Western options are not clearly defined. At the end of its mandate (1992-1996) the Iliescu regime proposes the signature of a friendship treaty with Hungary as a sign of the European future of the two countries<sup>4</sup>. The PDSR goes into the opposition at the 1996 elections. It reshapes its ideological traits/features and places itself clearly in favor of the Romanian accession to the EU through an international affiliation to the social-democratic family. In this logic for the 2000 elections the PDSR is associated with the PSDR in an

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<sup>1</sup> "Through: the assurance of transparency of the integrationist process, the institutional re-dimensioning in the domain of European integration, the evaluation of the costs of integration with the purpose of adapting the rhythm of transformations to the possibilities of absorption of the socio-economical system, the consolidation of the socio-economical strategy on the long term of Romania for the post-accession period" (D.A., The PNL-PD Alliance platform-program, Theodor Stolojan, Traian Băsescu, 28 September 2003; [www.pnl.ro](http://www.pnl.ro) or [www.pd.ro](http://www.pd.ro)).

<sup>2</sup> Tom GALLAGHER, "Nationalism and Romanian Political Culture in the 1990s", in Duncan LIGHT, David PHINNEMORE (eds.), *Post-communist Romania. Coming to Terms with Transition*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 104-124/p.108

<sup>3</sup> Denomination given to the PDSR-PUNR-PSM-PRM alliance.

<sup>4</sup> "The Message of the President Iliescu to the International Reunion *The French-German reconciliation in the perspective of the Romanian-Hungarian historic reconciliation*", *Dimineața/Cotroceni Palace*, no. 206, 15 March 1995.

electoral alliance, the *Social-Democratic Pole*<sup>1</sup>, foreseeing the fusion of the two parties the following year. As the political program established by the two parties statutes, the scope of seeing Romania integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structures legitimizes the social-democratic alliance:

"The shared option for the social-democratic values [...] in acknowledging the common fundamental objectives, the increasing of the civilization standard and of the well-being of the Romanian people, the affirmation of its national dignity, the creation of the necessary conditions for the integration of Romania in EU and NATO"<sup>2</sup>.

The European issue is thus a secondary question in the articulation of the political parties. The alliances, coalitions formed after 1989 bear on different ideological issues. Besides the CDR constituted as a "democratic and pro-occidental" alternative to the power of the FDSN/PDSR and legitimized by the non-attachment of its leaders to the communist regime, the other political collaborations do not include the European question as a defining element. The FDSN/PDSR allies with the nationalist parties and justifies thus the doubts it arises concerning its pro-Western availability. After 2000, the party articulations comprise compulsory the European issue as a declared political objective throughout the political spectrum. The European coordinate becomes a fundamental element of the political alliances. CDR-2000 is articulated in the continuation of the CDR<sup>3</sup>, its pro-European orientation is by its implied preliminary attachment to the European values. In the case of PSD (pole) this Europeanism is justified by the desire of the party to be recognized on an international scale. D.A. is an exclusively electoral alliance; Europeanism is already an important component of the political identity of the member parties, PNL and PD.

### *The Parties as Analytical Units. Particular Visions?*

The seeming consensus at the systemic level in what regards the adhesion to Euro-Atlantic organizations is identifiable at the rhetoric level. In order to advance a more detailed examination of the particular approach of the six case-studies a common analytical model will be used. Firstly it is necessary to remember the research questions and their particular assumptions stated at the outset of this study.

At the second level of analysis, of the particular political parties, the main research question is: What role does the European coordinate plays inside of each party? The sub-questions meant to enhance the investigation are: 1) *How do the Romanian political parties legitimize themselves in relation to Europe?*; 2) *Are there particular visions or do they completely converge?* Whereas the hypothesis advanced are: 1) The pro-European attitude/stance of Romanian political parties' is centered more on a strategic choice than on a profound ideological option (legitimacy inside the system<sup>4</sup>);

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<sup>1</sup> The alliance included PUR (The Romanian Humanist Party) as well as minor if not obscure parties.

<sup>2</sup> The political protocol concerning the fusion of PDSR and PSDR and the creation of the PSD, 8 September 2000.

<sup>3</sup> CDR2000 comprises but a limited number of political parties compared to the original CDR a highly extensive political alliance.

<sup>4</sup> "Recognition proved a valuable encouragement to party development, and in the case of political Left, the legitimacy this accorded was considered top priority." Geoffrey PRIDHAM,



2) In this logic, the international legitimacy the pan-European cooperation (admission in the International parties also) ensures is consequently used at the national level as a "quality guarantee"; 3) In the same line, the government participation and thus the direct confrontation with concrete/real problems presented by the integration process is used as a source of legitimacy; 4) Given the delay in the negotiation of accession (and the sensibility of the Romanian public), the Europeanism of the Romanian parties is conceived in a strong interdependence with the defense of questions related to the national interest; 5) And thus the seeming consensus hides particular visions linked to the post-communist evolution of each political formation.

The chosen case studies are the present five parliamentary parties (legislature 2000-2004): PSD, PD, PNL, UDMR and PRM; in addition, the case of PNȚCD will be considered. An extra parliamentary party, PNȚCD was one of the most important components of the CDR coalition and played an essential role during the 1996-2000 government. The six parties are to be replaced inside the system of party articulations and their singular evolutionary paths will be briefly described. It is not meant to reconstruct the particular histories of the political parties but, to allow their interrelation through a potentially common element: Europeanization. The period under scrutiny is 1996-2004 in what it coincides with the articulation of a conception on European related issues and with the advancement of Romania in the negotiation process.

So as to enlighten the European choices operated by the political actors we will use an analytical scheme that integrates the domains subject to Europeanization identified, for the EU member-states, by three of the already mentioned authors: Ladrech (the political change at the programmatic level and the organizational level, the statutes but only in what regards the juridical definition of the party) and Radaelli (the discourses, the identities) and integrating the coordinates susceptible of being influenced by Europeanization identifies by Pridham (identity, ideology, programs).

Firstly the six parties will be placed in subcategories linked to their particular (re)creation in specific contexts. The intrinsic limitations of these sub-categories have to be acknowledged. The first group of actors (*revolutionary parties/social-democratic*) is composed of the PSD and the PD. The two parties comport a legitimizing discourse based on their participation to the systemic change operated in December 1989. Thereafter they both assume a social-democrat identity, a legitimacy they compete about and to which they accede through their subsequent collaboration (coalitions/alliances/fusion) with a historical party, the PSDR (Romanian Social Democrat Party) a long-time member of the transnational network of social-democrats.

The PNȚCD and the PNL representing quite opposite ideologies, a combination of anti-communism, defense of the rights of the peasants and Christian-Democratic principles for the first and an everlastingly disputed liberalism for the second one, will be part of the *second category of historical parties*.

The *new parties*<sup>1</sup> category comprises two quite different parties, on one side there is the PRM hardly gradable, especially if its last programmatic/ideological

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"Patterns of Europeanization...cit.", p. 195; "Yet, this hierarchical perspective on Europeanization should not obscure the usage by domestic actors for their own purposes." Klaus H. GOETZ, *The New Members States and the EU*, cit., p. 4.

<sup>1</sup> In the sense given to the term by De Waele, parties created following the systemic changes and that do not assume a pro/anti-communist position.

changes are taken into account and on the other side, the most important political formation of the Magyar minority of Romania, UDMR.

The revolutionary parties having incorporated a social-democrat option oppose, especially in the first period, the so called opposition parties, that are the historic parties: PNȚCD, PNL and PSDR. But this opposition ex/anti-communist does not follow a linear logic. By its participation to the government of T. Stolojan<sup>1</sup>, a technocrat and therefore independent Prime Minister under the Iliescu regime, PNL infringed the feral opposition prone by the PNȚCD. Moreover, after the breakdown of the FSN, the PD was associated with the democratic opposition mostly by its collaboration (through the USD) with the coalition government of 1996-2000.

The UDMR integrated in the CDR at the beginnings, incorporates in its discourse an anti-communist component. I consider that the political path pursued by the UDMR follows mostly a strategic logic designed to accomplish the interests of the Magyar minority by the means of collaboration schemes established with the political forces in power. It is for this reason that I have positioned it together with the PRM in the category of new parties. This class of parties has its limits. The UDMR and the PRM are opposing each other on the basis of a classic rokkian cleavage of center-periphery: the PRM promotes an exacerbated nationalism and the safeguard of the national interest and the UDMR is a defender of a more thorough decentralization. This rokkanian classification has to bear in mind two essential *a priori*. On one side it is true that the UDMR renews with a tradition of representation of the Magyar minority<sup>2</sup> but both its legitimacy and its political message are not founded on this historical filiation. Furthermore, the PRM is frequently identified as the promoter of a nostalgic message in relation to the Ceaușescu regime and would thus be integrated in a logic of continuation with the former regime<sup>3</sup>. The ultra-nationalist stance of the PRM, its proclaimed transformation from an anti-system party<sup>4</sup> into a Christian Democrat party, render even more difficult the identification of its original traits and its definitive classification. The PRM would thus be the perfect example for J.M. De Waele's remark that "parties are created in Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of several cleavages"<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly the PRM is placed in the category of new parties, which were not formed on the base of ex/anti-communist cleavage, its message being above all focused on the reunification of Great Romania and the defense of the national interest.

As it was already mentioned, none of the six parties was formed in order to defend a specific European issue. Nevertheless, they all globally share a pro-European option. *What is then the weight Europe bears inside each party?* In order to respond to this question, a comprehensively analysis of the particular visions of the six case-studies follows. The party level questions that were advanced: 1) *How do parties legitimate themselves in relation to Europe?* and 2) *Are there any particular visions or do they converge completely?* will be answered by the use of an analytical model constructed by the means of the analytical landmarks of Ladrech, Radaelli, Olsen and Pridham. Firstly it has to be verified if at the statutory level, the parties mention the European coordinate as a defining ideological element. Moreover it

<sup>1</sup> Stolojan government: 16 October 1991-18 November 1992.

<sup>2</sup> Reka HORVATH, "La minorité hongroise de Roumanie et sa représentation politique" (draft) presentation GASPPECO 26 April 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Daniel-Louis SEILER, *Les partis politiques*, cit. p. 148.

<sup>4</sup> Giovanni SARTORI, *Parties...* cit., pp. 132-133.

<sup>5</sup> Jean-Michel DE WAELE, "L'émergence..." cit.

has to be established if Europe and more specifically the European integration engender any changes at the ideological/identity level. In a second sequence, the particular visions will be considered in order to demonstrate if there is differentiation or convergence. The particular visions of the political parties include several elements: specific vision on the European integration, vision on Europe/EU, reasons for the Romanian integration in the European structures, what Romania can bring to the EU and the contribution the party in question proclaims it can procure to the process as such. These are the *a priori* common elements to the six parties under analysis.

## THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES/ SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

### *FSN – National Salvation Front (1990-1992), Revolutionary Legitimacy*

The FSN formed the 22<sup>nd</sup> of December 1989 as a provisory organ of power in order to "establish democracy, liberty and the dignity of the Romanian people" declared the 3<sup>rd</sup> of January 1990 that it is not a party and it doesn't intend to transform in one. Nevertheless, the 23<sup>rd</sup> of January 1990 CFSN<sup>1</sup> decides to constitute in a political party so as to participate in the first democratic elections. Thus begins the history of the first two case-studies. At the first Convention of the party in 1991, the Front is defined as a "center-left party with a social-democratic doctrine". However, at the FSN Convention of 27-29 March 1992, the Iliescu group and the Roman group<sup>2</sup> separate. Henceforth the two parties (FDSN-Iliescu and FSN-Roman) will dispute the double legitimacy, revolutionary/social-democratic.

### *Social Democrat Party (PSD)<sup>3</sup>*

The PDSR is the party that governs the most, in the intervals 1990-1996 and 2000-2004. It is thus the party that had a direct contact with the rapprochement of the EU. The collaboration it establishes with the nationalist parties, the "red quadrilateral" (PUNR, PSM, PRM), its nationalistic drifts and its hesitating foreign policy orientations put under question its pro-European option and more extensively its pro-occidental stance<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Council of the FSN.

<sup>2</sup> Ion Iliescu is the president of Romania in the period 1989-1996 while Petre Roman is his prime minister until September 1991 when he is overthrown by a revolt of the Miners who arrive in Bucharest.

<sup>3</sup> PDSR: 29 April 1992- 16 June 2001; PSD: June 2001-present.

<sup>4</sup> Steven D. ROPER, *Romania. The Unfinished Revolution*, Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2000, pp. 108-122; Tom GALLAGHER, "Nationalism...cit.", pp. 104-124; David PHINNEMORE, "Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration Since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?", in Duncan LIGHT, David PHINNEMORE, *Post-Communist Romania. Coming to Terms with Transition*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 245-269.

### *Statutory Level*

The two main aspects of the doctrinaire identity of the PDSR are the founding moment, the 1989 revolution and the contemporary European Social-Democracy. The revolutionary legitimacy keeps its doctrinaire preeminence in the party definitions until 1996. After the electoral defeat the PDSR goes through an ideological re-definition process. Thus, more clearly after 1997, the reference made to the founding cleavage, participants to the revolution versus historical parties, becomes secondary. The PDSR is still the "authentic continuator of the ideals and political aspirations expressed by the FSN in December 1989"<sup>1</sup>, but it emphasizes more its pro-European character, it is thus "a Social-Democrat modern party, of center-left, a reforming party dedicated to the social, national progress with a European vocation"<sup>2</sup>. The definitive turning point of the PDSR can therefore be placed at this moment (1997) in what it chooses to acquire an international recognition as a Social-Democrat party with a European vocation (Euro-Atlantic). The doctrinaire precision of the party is imagined by its leaders in accord with the developments observed in Western Europe<sup>3</sup>. The major doctrinaire fundament of the party becomes the European Social-Democracy. After 2000 this element is more clearly emphasized as the main political coordinate of the PDSR. The social-democratic unification, in 2001 with the PSDR (a historical party which is already a member of the international Social-Democrat network<sup>4</sup>) provides the actual PSD with a newly gained Social-Democrat label, useful in order to proclaim its leading role in the creation of a left pole<sup>5</sup>. The international contacts thus ensured will be used by the party so as to promote, in this informal manner also<sup>6</sup>, the Romanian integration in the EU. The definition of the PSD as it is enounced by the present statute encompasses these transformations:

"The PSD is a modern national, center-left party having a European vocation, that militates for the edification in Romania of a State of right, social and democrat (art.3. p.2) The PSD promotes the social-democrat contemporary

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<sup>1</sup> Political program PDSR 21.09.2000: "The ideas and the political options of the party find their genesis in the Declaration-program of the Romanian revolution of 1989. Practically the doctrine and the actions of our party respond to the ideals and the quasi-general expectations of December 1989, that in Romania be launched a program of economical and social reforms that ensures to all the citizens the rights and political liberties and decent living conditions".

<sup>2</sup> Political program PDSR adopted the 20-21 June 1997 by the National Conference of the party.

<sup>3</sup> "After more than two decades of preeminence of the Liberal, rightist orientations – in developed Europe as well as in the immediate post-revolutionary period in the Eastern states – we assist at a return to the first plan of the social and human problems, at a rebalancing of the political tendencies and options. The project of European unification is rethought now in the perspective of Social Europe as opposed to Liberal Europe, technocratic and financier." (Political program PDSR, 1997.)

<sup>4</sup> As Sorina Soare notes, the PSDR plays the role of pivot-party in the Social-Democrat camp, it plays the same role for the PD (through the USD alliance).

<sup>5</sup> "The party that enjoys the most constant presence in the parliament, the PSD is the most powerful and structured political force. We are those that have operated the great Social-Democratic unification in Romania, a unique process of political convergence transmitting an important signal of maturity to the Socialist International that will acknowledge we hope its undeniable value." (Adrian NĂSTASE, *Towards Normality. A Modern Social Democracy Vision of Romania's Future*, National council PSD, Bucharest 12 October 2002.)

<sup>6</sup> This mention made by the PSD confirms Pridham's conclusion "Patterns of Europeanization...cit.", pp. 184, 192.

doctrine founded on the principles of liberty, social justice, equality of chances and solidarity (art.3.p.3)<sup>1</sup>.

Moreover the PSD

"adheres to the values and principles promoted by the IS and militates for their application in the Romanian social and political life, collaborates and maintains relations to other social-democratic parties or organizations or of other democratic political origin (art.4 p.12)".

The process of European integration is proclaimed a priority objective by the party statute:

"The PSD supports the strategy of integration of Romania in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures (art.4.p.10)".

### *The Dignified Integration to the EU*

The process of European integration is considered by the PSD as a strategic objective of outmost importance of the foreign policy, corresponding to the national volition, to the desire of the entire society to integrate the EU. Central space of its political reference, Europe (even though constant references are made also in relation to the United States) and its political construction, the EU are imagined in the Social-Democrat view in relation to the fundamental idea of its political program, the national interest<sup>2</sup>. The vision of the PSD on the process of European integration evolves nevertheless. Its constant contact with the realities of the integration procedures brings the PSD to declare it from a major foreign policy objective, the primary objective of the internal policies. The achievements of the successive PDSR/PSD governments are considered a quality guarantee of the party's ability to finalize the accession process. The most important aspect of the PDSR's vision on the European integration is that the internal development will bring the accession of Romania to the EU and NATO. The integration is therefore not a goal in itself but the "most significant instrument Romania possesses in order to react to the general tendencies of globalization"<sup>3</sup>. Therefore the advancements in the reform process and the progress registered at the internal level are decisive in the process of integration to the EU. A note has to be made concerning the distinction introduced by the PSD between the necessary efforts deployed by Romania and the contribution Romania can procure to the European edifice (shared millenary history with the European space and the actual potential of the country).

### *The Role of Romania in the European Construction*

For the PDSR/PSD, Romania was and remains a stability factor in the "Central-European zone" neighboring the Balkans. Romania's role is therefore a histori-

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<sup>1</sup> Statute PSD [www.psd.ro](http://www.psd.ro).

<sup>2</sup> The PDSR considers "essential the reaffirmation of the national idea as the fundament of the entire strategic and programmatic complex of the PDSR, the ideal and the unconditional attachment both towards the national values as towards those of the Social-Democracy are the resources of our will *to save Romania*. Our program has to offer us once again the dignity of free citizens, belonging to a nation proud of its past, a people with a constructive and European vocation". (National Conference PDSR 9 October 1999/Political Rapport.)

<sup>3</sup> Electoral offer PDSR 2000.

cal one: a guard at the boundaries of Europe, defender of the Christian values and turning point in a zone of confluence of spaces<sup>1</sup>. At the question "What can Romania bring to the future of Europe?" the response of Adrian Năstase, the president of the party is integrated in this logic:

"...we already perceive it, it resides in the continuity with the role played during centuries in the European history. The Romanian lands were by excellence the easterner fortress of Christianity, the bastion that defended more than once Europe of the Eastern invasions. We were more than boundary guards, we were confident protectors of a civilization with all its components. We have made many sacrifices in the name of these values that we share as Romanians and as a Christian and European people. There is a historical vocation of regional stability that Romania has to assume and pursue. We can not know in detail what will be the precise contribution Romania can bring to the unified, at least economically Europe of the future, we could be the 'basket of bread' of Europe, a point of tourist attraction, an elite human resources capital specialized in different technical-scientific fields. What we already know is our mission to generate stability to the East and in the Balkans. Romania will continue to irradiate the western European democratic principles to these regions. In the Middle Age Romanians were called upon to defend Christian Europe. Romania, at the beginning of the third millennium will be called to consolidate the European political culture at the South-Eastern boundaries of the continent"<sup>2</sup>.

Besides the stabilizing role in the region and the guarding of the European boundaries, the Romanians Europeanism is intrinsic and

"it is guaranteed not by the geographical position or by the assimilation of a legislative baggage or of superficial political procedures, given that Romanians have always been Europeans and that 45 years of communism have not driven away their sentiments of belonging and of their place in the continent...it is necessary to use messages capable of reminding them their historical, political, religious and cultural identity".

Romania possesses furthermore an important economical, human and spiritual potential that will contribute to the "construction of a united Europe, stable and prosperous". These two elements (role in the region and the important potential of Romania) conjoined to the shared history of Romania and the European space render the European integration of Romania a necessity of historical order, beyond the security and economical imperatives.

### *The PSD Model of the EU*

The model of EU privileged by the PSD is supported by a vision centered on the importance of the national interest and the safeguard of the national sovereignty. Meanwhile, the party searches to detach itself of the image it gained as a

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<sup>1</sup> "Romania represents the second state in dimension of Central Europe and holds a key position in this space of confluence of three civilization spaces: the contact point of the western world, the Middle East and the vastness of the Russian territories, Romania has also a linkage role between Northern Europe and Southern Europe". (Political program of the PDSR 21.09.2000.)

<sup>2</sup> Adrian NĂSTASE, *Romania in A United Europe*, Romanian Social Institute, București, 2003, pp. 18-19.

nationalist party, the national/-ist vision wouldn't undermine the integrationist process, the two would only complete each other,

"In the dispute between the adepts of a global Europeanist vision versus nationalism, the PDSR continues to be the adept of solutions that avoid extremism in all its forms, it considers that the nation is still a political (geopolitical), economic, cultural concept that possesses major resources in international relations and that a national political vision is not opposed to the process of integration and opening towards the circulation of material and spiritual values as well as persons in the space more and more open of the contemporary world"<sup>1</sup>.

Thus the PSD promotes the *juste milieu* between federalism and inter-governmentalism,

"between the federation of states having an executive with certain but limited powers controlled by the legislative, a judicial system composed of the European Court of Justice that ensures the supremacy of the European constitution and the system of European law with a president of the Union which would hold a mandate of representative of the federation"<sup>2</sup>.

The choices operated by the PSD are nevertheless situated in the "logic of compensation" established between the EU and NATO integration processes. "The essence of the foreign policy promoted by the PDSR resides in the comprehension, the formulation and the pursuit of its own interests that are national by nature, signification and finality"<sup>3</sup>. This quotation represents the "safety valve" of the PDSR/PSD. The PDSR could thus oppose the 1999 NATO intervention in ex-Yugoslavia. In the same line, the PSD could declare that its support for the American intervention in Iraq in the spring of 2003, a position that was against the commonly agreed EU position (Romania had at that time already closed the chapter on foreign policy), was legitimized by the Romanian national interest<sup>4</sup>. The PSD seems though to be guided in its foreign policy by the "national interest" despite the conveyed commitments with its foreign partners.

### *Democrat Party (PD)*

After the FSN breakdown, the PD<sup>5</sup> is integrated in the opposition against the party of Ion Iliescu. Its opposition is a particular one. The PD is defined on the

<sup>1</sup> Political Offer of the PDSR 1999 (National Conference 9 October 1999).

<sup>2</sup> Adrian NĂSTASE, *Europa, quo vadis?*, Regia Autonomă Monitorul Oficial, București, 2001, Conclusions pp.154-156

<sup>3</sup> "The PDSR will act accordingly to the identification of the necessary means for the highlight of the national interests of Romania and will block any drifting designed to endanger these interests, the dignity and national identity, indifferent to the political and economical evolutions at the global, continental or regional level. The PDSR opts for a strategy that ensures simultaneously the attributes of the Romanian National State as a sovereign state, unitary and independent and its integration in the West-European and Euro-Atlantic structures, considered as priority in the realization of our interests and modernization aspirations." (Political Program PDSR 2000.)

<sup>4</sup> Adrian Năstase declared at that time that "NATO is for now, EU it's for later" so as to justify the support of Romania for the US against the EU.

<sup>5</sup> The 11 May 1993, the FSN and the Democratic Party merged and changed its name into PD-FSN, change made official by the decision no. 13 of the Tribunal of the Municipality of Bucharest, 23 May 1993.

basis of the same ideological axis as the PSD, the revolution/social-democrat axis. The PD enjoys nevertheless a more positive image than the PDSR of Iliescu. Allied to the PSDR inside the Social Democrat Union (USD), the PD participates to the 1996-2000 government (CDR-USD-UDMR). After 2000, the PD is reformed under the presidency of Traian Băsescu, the mayor of Bucharest.

### *Statutory Level*

The particularity of the PD is it accentuates more clearly its pro-European, Social-Democrat option after its separation from the FSN. Its trajectory is thus noticeably attached to the European social-democrat principles. The PD is ideologically defined in relation to this particular political family. It assumes the accomplishment of the political goals in conformity with the European Social-Democrat vision<sup>1</sup>. Through its collaboration with the PSDR between 1995 and 1998 (USD) it integrates in the international party organizations earlier than its sister-party, the PDSR<sup>2</sup>. The external legitimacy is therefore more accentuated in the case of the PD. It invokes it as a proof of its recognition by the foreign partners. Henceforth PD's commitment to a pro-European (and moreover pro-Western) stance is without equivokes. The present statute of the party confirms the party's affiliation:

"The PD is a full member of the IS and an associated member of the PSE, militates for the promotion of the Romanian interests on the international scene for the integration of the country in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, for the reinforcement of the relations with the party members of these international organizations, participating to all the debates, local and regional projects of the European Social-Democracy (art.5 (4))"<sup>3</sup>.

Despite the electoral alliance established in 2003 with the PNL (D.A.) the PD maintains its Social-Democrat orientation. An important element of this alliance is related to the new image the PD is presenting. Thus, the party breaks with its revolutionary legitimacy and is redefined as a team of young men, professionals; the accent is furthermore placed on politics at the local level. The annulment of the founding cleavage is confirmed:

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<sup>1</sup> "The PD is a Social-Democrat party, a modern party of national extension, a full member of the Socialist International (SI) that has as goal the development and the modernization of the Romanian society through the promotion and the setting in place in Romania of the Social-Democrat doctrine and policy, respecting the republican values and the fundamental principles of the modern European Social-Democracy: democracy, liberty, dignity, social justice, equality of chances, social solidarity. (art. 4 [2]). By its national vocation, the PD is the party of the present and perspective interests of the Romanian nation, of each citizen of Romania (art. 5 [1])." (PD Statute.)

<sup>2</sup> The PD is a member with full rights of the IS (since November 1999) and an associated member to the PSE (March 1999). At the Congress in New York of the IS (9-11 September 1996) the PD is received in the organization. For a more detailed analysis of the European path of the PD, see Ramona COMAN, "Européanisation et coopération politique des partis. Une perspective roumaine", *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. III, no. 3, 2003, pp. 649-697.

<sup>3</sup> PD Statute adopted in 2001, [www.pd.ro](http://www.pd.ro).



"Our politicians are young men, men that were only 18 years old in December 1989 or experienced people of the central and local administration, a team of young men and women that can assume government in a responsible and mature manner"<sup>1</sup>.

*The PD, "the Most Pro-European  
and the Most Pro-European Integration"*

The study of the programmatic documents of the party shows a clear evolution. The period 1992-2001 under the presidency of Petre Roman is characterized by an abundance of texts of the PD signed essentially by Roman. This attests the political personalization by the association of the party with its leader. The documents dealing with the European vision of the PD, are in the above mentioned period, dominated by references to the December revolution since the leader Roman was an actively involved actor of those days (he was a prime minister in the period December 1989-September 1991). With the election of a new president of the party (Traian Băsescu is elected president of the PD in May 2001) things change significantly; the party programs become more precise and the reference made to the founding cleavage disappears. The PD praises its role as the first party (through its direct relation to the FSN) to acknowledge the need to "integrate in the structures of collective security of the civilized world"<sup>2</sup>. Thus the new Romanian foreign policy, "started a few hours after the December revolution, presupposed the total des-ideologisation and the alignment to the European standards". The good governance promoted by the PD pursues the invalidation of a tendency present all throughout the XX century, "the alienation and the separation of the natural circuit of values of the general-European space, tendency manifest, despite the Latinity, the European aspirations and the synthesis vocation of its spirituality"<sup>3</sup>. "The European integration is the very reform" agreed upon as the convergence of the Romanian society with the present tendencies of the occidental society. This idea is one of the leitmotifs of the programmatic documents of the party. Thus, integration represents a certitude, it is "only a question of time"<sup>4</sup>, it will be the natural result of the internal reforms.

*Reasons for Romanian' Europeanism*

In the democrat conception, the Romanian national culture and the European culture are linked together by all the threads of the historical evolution. The historic return of Romania to Europe is imagined in this logic:

"Romania is one of the states that created the history of the continent and that shares the common European destiny [...] after having been against

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<sup>1</sup> Speech by Traian Băsescu, National Conference of the PD 29 August 2003.

<sup>2</sup> PD For a New National Policy. Oradea Declaration 1994.

<sup>3</sup> PD for the Reform, the Social Protection, Priorities for the Industry, Commerce, Transports, Infrastructure, Good Governance for the Country, 1999, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> PD "trust in each one, Chances for all!" motion presented by Petre Roman 18 February 2000, sub-chapter "Romania, A Future Member of the EU".

its will, for half a century on the wrong side of history, the democratic transition has offered us the chance of being on the good side of history"<sup>1</sup>.

"The strategic objective of Romania and its historic chance is to be a member state of the EU!"<sup>2</sup>.

For the Democrat Party, the European integration process is not imagined in relation to the defense of the national interest. It displays nonetheless a definitively Euro-enthusiast position at the level of rhetoric in agreement with P. Roman's declaration: "I do not think there is a more pro-European or pro-European integration Romanian party"<sup>3</sup>. The important potential of Romania will be highlighted by its accession to the EU:

"An effective and active foreign policy will be endorsed so as to bring Romania in the first line of the process of structuring of the European and Euro-Atlantic space, given the measure of its dimensions, resources and the intelligence of its people"<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, PD's pro-European orientation is firm, it is nevertheless indissoluble of the Euro-Atlantic integration.

"We, the PD are very committed, we are fighting by all the possible means for the Romanian integration in the EU and NATO and I am firmly convinced that the road to peace and well-being is the path towards the EU and inside the NATO resides our security [...] Through the NATO integration our European vocation will be confirmed, reinforce by the transatlantic dimension"<sup>5</sup>.

With the election of T. Băsescu as president of the PD, the party's stance on European integration changes. Thus Europe is the one that needs Romania and the European integration does not signify the annulment of the unique character of the national identity, but on the contrary its valorization. So, from a clearly Euro-enthusiastic attitude, the tone of the programmatic positioning of the PD is softened/nuanced. A more Eurosceptic position is adopted:

"We are going towards the integration with our national identity, with our ethnic and religious diversity, with our cultural identity, with our history and our traditions, in a word with the conscience of our unity and our uniqueness. Europe needs Romanians and not another sort of Germans, French or Spanish. Europe needs our value, our power and our talents"<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Petre ROMAN, *Romania at the Hour of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration*, political note-book 1999.

<sup>2</sup> PD, "The Future Begins With You?" electoral manifest, October 2000: "Citizens! You are future members of the EU! We, the members of the PD, citizens like you, we are offering you: an economy for new work opportunities by investments and efficiency! Romania's modernization in the years 2000-2004! Let's join the EU in 2007".

<sup>3</sup> "The Political Commitment of the PD in the Elections Perspective", political report presented by Petre Roman at the Director College of the PD, 2nd July 2000, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> "First for the People! Let us insure the development of the country and the social justice!", electoral manifest of the USD, 6th September 1996.

<sup>5</sup> Petre ROMAN, *Romania at the Hour...*cit.

<sup>6</sup> "PD Powerful Romania, Social-Democratic Romania", motion presented by T. Băsescu 18-19 May 2001. Political program of the PD.

## HISTORIC PARTIES AND THE ANTI-COMMUNIST OPTION

### *National Peasant Christian and Democratic Party (PNȚCD)*

The PNȚCD is the first post-communist party re-created after 1989. It assumes its precedent identity, before 1945 essentially peasant and adding a Christian-Democrat corollary (the particle *cd* is written in minuscule at the beginning). Its Christian-Democrat doctrinaire choice was concealed at the beginnings (and in a measure still is today) by an accentuation of the anti-communist attitude and by the logic of historic continuation, a symbol of the non-attachment of its leaders to the communist regime. Its leaders are imprisoned and persecuted during the communist era; after the revolution they revive the political project anterior to the instauration of the communists and promote a return to the "glorious interwar period". The PNȚCD is legitimized thus in a logic of continuity by an appeal to the pre-communist memory and by proclaiming its role as a fiercely opponent of the communist regime. Pivot party and initiator of the unification projects of the democratic opposition to the monopolistic power exerted by the PDSR, the PNȚCD is situated in a direct opposition to this party; it positions itself thus on the post-communist/historical parties cleavage. The PNȚCD governs (CDR-USD-UDMR government) between 1996 and 2000. In 2000, the PNȚCD continues the already failed political project and attempts to recreate a new version of the CDR, CDR-2000. This political alliance regrouped a number of minor parties and contained an important anti-communist stance. This political choice proved to be a failure. The PNȚCD becomes thus from the major governing party an extra-parliamentary party. The electoral failure provokes a redefinition of the party. The solution did not prove its success, at the local elections of 2004, PNȚCD' electoral scores remain modest. A new political crisis sees the resignation of the leader of the party, V. Ciorbea and the reelection of a new leader, the only mayor elected in 2004 of the party, G. Ciuhandu.

### *Statutory Level*

The PNȚCD subject to echoing internal conflicts maintains its doctrinaire options. Even when major changes are announced, the ideological landmarks continue to be the same. Nevertheless, the European integration provokes changes inside the programmatic positioning. The doctrine of PNȚCD as it is stated from the beginnings is "of Christian-Democratic essence" and has as fundamental principles "the Christian morality, the illuminated patriotism, democracy and justice". The role of the party as a historic political actor is also a constant of the party discourse. The international legitimacy and the help its international contacts provide to the "Romanian cause" are part of the PNȚCD's identity. The PNȚCD declares its leading role in the decision taken by the Helsinki European Council in 1999 to open the accession negotiations with Romania "this decision being in great measure the expression of the Christian-Democratic solidarity expressed at

the Congress of the EPP of November 1997"<sup>1</sup>. The international opening of the party is anterior to the systemic change, the party is affiliated to the CDI<sup>2</sup> and the UECD as early as 1987 by its clandestine leader, Corneliu Coposu. After 2001 the party seems to be stabilized and the international affiliation is accentuated in spite of its historical coordinate. The present statute of the party maintains its international legitimacy as an essential corollary of its identity. This international legitimacy entails the promotion of the European integration by the support accorded to the Christian-Democratic doctrine. The *new direction* taken by the PNȚCD after the electoral defeat of 2004 is an accentuation of the historic legacy of the party, its revival starting with Transylvania (its new president is the mayor of Timișoara) and a strong anti-communist message. Moreover the party would like to be the center force of a reunified Christian-Democratic party in view of the future integration to the EU. G. Ciuhandu is thus mandated by the president of the EPP to form a new right pole.

### *"The Main Promoter of the European Integration"*

The option of the PNȚCD bears no ambiguities, it is pro-European integration. Its support to the integrationist process is a constant of its discourse. The PNȚCD legitimizes by its early choice, before the 1989 revolution, compared to the "neo-communists" which are political chameleons, their choice being a strategic one. Thus

"The PNȚCD is the principal promoter of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country; the first elaborations of the projects of European integration belong to the intellectuals and politicians of the party, Iuliu Maniu and his generation of party leaders. Since the inter-war period and then just after 1989, the PNȚCD has militated for the rapprochement of Romania to the grate European democracies"<sup>3</sup>.

The European integration is conceived as the "*return inside the family* with which it shares the same values". The political purpose of the PNȚCD is supported by the desire of the Romanian population to see the country "*integrated in NATO and reintegrated in Europe* to whom it has always belonged to and from where it has been driven away, contrary to its will, by the communist regime". The pro-integrationist option is furthermore the only solution for Romania; otherwise "it will lag behind in a grey zone and fall under the influence of the East".

### *National Liberal Party (PNL)*

Following the post-communist history of the Romanian Liberal family proves to be an arduous task given that the scissions, the fusions and subsequent separations are numerous. The definitive liberal reunification isn't accomplished until

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<sup>1</sup> "Acțiunea românească în unitatea europeană", 2001 Political program of the PNȚCD adopted by the National Committee, 2 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Christian Democratic International [www.idc-cdi.org](http://www.idc-cdi.org).

<sup>3</sup> "Acțiunea românească ...cit."

1998 and the PNL stabilizes around the year 2000. After the 2000 elections the conflicts inside the party are resolved by the election as a president of an *outsider*, T. Stolojan. The PNL is thus the pole of reunification of the various Liberal fractures. The PNL is an important actor of the political scene mainly as a result of its label of historic party and by its important role in the right pole (CDR) than by its electoral scores (around 7%). The anti-communist stance of the PNL is not as exclusive as the one exhibited by the PNȚCD; the PNL participates at the FSN government in 1991 and signs a collaboration agreement with the PSD in 2001 (a pact that will be invalidated later on).

*Statutory Level, the Beginnings:  
Tradition and Anti-communism*

The PNL "a European modern and powerful party 'has an internal structure' similar to the European Liberal parties already in the period 1875-1947"<sup>1</sup>. Therefore it assumes successfully, at the moment of the systemic change the label of historic party, in the direct continuity of the previous PNL (1875-1947). The PNL declares moreover to be motivated by the fight against the neo-communist power and against the monopoly established by the members of the second and third echelon of the nomenclature.

*Statutory Level, the Reunification:  
Tradition and International Affiliation*

After the organizational stabilization, in 2000 PNL evokes its double legitimacy under another form. Firstly it makes an appeal to its past "identified largely with the history of modernity in Romania". Secondly it is legitimized by "the greatness of its principles and by the European political tradition to which it claims adherence". The international legitimacy becomes the second identity corollary of the PNL. This international recognition is integrated in the present definition of the party:

"As a Liberal party, a member of the Liberal Democrat and Reformist European Party<sup>2</sup> and of the Liberal International, it assumes the representation of the ideas and the values of the Romanian democratic right, accordingly to the traditional principle by ourselves, but also to the values of liberal democracy and capitalism"<sup>3</sup>.

*PNL the "Promoter of European Integration"*

The option of the PNL is clear it clearly supports the European integration of Romania. As early as in 1990, the PNL "the artisan of modern Romania" has as a political purpose "to integrate Romania in tomorrow's Europe"<sup>4</sup>. However the

<sup>1</sup> *Repere pentru o istorie a PNL după decembrie 1989*, Editura Libripres, București, 2000, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> The ELDR has become the ALDE – Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament.

<sup>3</sup> Statute PNL 2003.

<sup>4</sup> 27 January 1990, Sketch of political program, adopted the 28 March 1990 by the National Conference of the PNL.

PNL privileges a unitary, global vision. Considering the foreign policy objectives as necessarily designed to serve Romania's interests on the long term, T. Stolojan (presidential candidate of the PNL in 2000), stresses the main objective of both internal and external policy: the Romanian integration to the EU, NATO and WEU:

"This option will confirm the communion between the Romanian nation and the other European nations. These organizations have different domains of activity but yet they complement one another so as to offer us what we search for in so long: the defense of our identity in the conditions of democratic, economic and military security"<sup>1</sup>.

### *The Nationalist Vision of the PNL*

In order to clarify the particular vision of the PNL concerning the European problematic, two documents that accentuate the national interest implied by the accession process to the EU are edifying. If the European integration is a shared objective of all the Romanian democratic political parties the PNL defines through the *Liberal Manifest* its own development option:

"The transformation of the Romanian society in a post-industrial community, informational, flexible and effective, culturally post-modern. Only this type of open and free society, frame for a rapid economic growth could recover the discrepancies to the advanced countries, will be immune to the detrimental influences of the collectivist state and would be able to react promptly and effectively to all the regional and global changes; allow the quick accumulation of autochthon capital so necessary to the consolidation of a national identity; will prevent our transformation in a simple market for the products of others and a simple reservoir of cheap work force. Thus, trying to copy others' models, trying to adapt systems and economical structures of others can only be devoted to failing. The European integration as an accelerated development purpose as it is conceived by the *Liberal Manifest* will be realized not through legislative mimetic, the mechanical pick-up of norms, institutions and standards but through the stimulation of an open economical environment, competitive that offers to capital the two necessary conditions: stability and profitability. Romania's chance of catching back the gaps is constituted exactly by our accrued capability of assimilating such radical system changes. We have to assume the challenge of skipping stages. We can not valorize our chances by taking up the same historical path as the Western path. Today the premises of three types of reform have to be laid down: educational, institutional and economical. These three reforms will create the necessary frame for the growth of Romanian capitalism, integrated to the EU and to the globalized capitalism. We will thus arrive to a negotiation position, a result of the economical policies able to convince our partners that they have all the interest to integrate also in this formal manner this part of Europe. In the new world of globalization of markets and spiritualization of boundaries we can not become partners and competitors but by gaining our individual identity and in an implicit manner, the national identity. The PNL promotes thus the Romanian capitalism, a projection of this type of society<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Theodor Stolojan political program 2000.

<sup>2</sup> The *Liberal Manifest* adopted by the National Council of the PNL April 1999.

The national question in PNL's acceptance is also stressed by another programmatic document, issued in 2001. The PNL promotes thus the unitary national state as basis of the European integration.

"The Romanian, a patriot, loves his country and his people, he feels attached to the identity patrimony, assumes his past and present history with all its grandeur and its sad moments, strives to ensure that the progress of the Romanian society does not despise anyone, is open to cooperation and to reciprocal exchanges. To make this image real, a sustained effort of systematic civic education, the school, the Church and the civil society are called upon to play an essential role. The premise has to be that each one is attached to the nation, this attitude matching perfectly the patriotism of the state you are part of"<sup>1</sup>.

### THE NEW PARTIES/SECTORIAL VISION AND DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTERESTS

#### *Democrat Union of the Magyars of Romania (RMDSZ<sup>2</sup>/UDMR)*

The UDMR is not formally a party but an association/union/formation regrouping political, economical and cultural platforms. I share Reka's Horvath opinion in stating that UDMR combines both the logic of movement and that of party, accentuating after its participation to the 1996-2000 government, its party option<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, the Union doesn't have a unified doctrine; none of the different political affinities manages to show its preeminence. Of these different political sensibilities, the Party of Christian Democrats of Hungarians in Romania has integrated the party International, the UEDC<sup>4</sup>/PPE. In spite of this integration the UDMR has not articulated a Christian-Democrat message. All these elements make the analysis of the UDMR even more difficult. Nevertheless among the minority organizations, it is the only to have surpassed the electoral threshold without benefiting of the stipulations of the electoral law<sup>5</sup>. UDMR adds to its logic of minority movement, an anti-communist component; it participates therefore to the creation of the different forms of association of the anti-communist opposition<sup>6</sup>. Yet, in

<sup>1</sup> *The National Question in the PNL's Vision*. Adopted by the National Council 8 June 2001 ("The PNL loyal to its traditions and to the *national* present in its denomination".)

<sup>2</sup> Románia Magyar Demokrata Szövetség.

<sup>3</sup> Reka HORVATH, *Quels clivages dans le cadre de la minorité hongroise de Roumanie?* Presentation to the International Conference "What political cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe?", ULB Bruxelles 9-10 May 2003.

<sup>4</sup> The Union receives the observer status in 1995. In October 1999, UDMR becomes an associated member of the PPE. Ramona COMAN, "La coopération paneuropéenne des parties politiques", *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. II, no. 2, 2002, pp. 203-212/p. 212.

<sup>5</sup> Cristian PREDĂ, "Les partis politiques dans le postcommunisme roumain", *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. III, no. 4, 2003, pp. 943-986/p. 964.

<sup>6</sup> CNID (15 December 1990 with the PNȚCD, PNL, PER and the PSDR) and CDR in 1991 (presenting yet different electoral lists). Following the 1996 elections, the UDMR is integrated in the government of the CDR.

2000 the UDMR signs a protocol of political collaboration with the PSD, a pact that has been renewed every year since. Hitherto, the UDMR follows primarily a logic of political action designed to achieve the political goals of the Hungarian minority (and based therefore less on political affinities). UDMR's political participation allows it to pursue the accomplishment of a part of its political goals and on another side it plays an integrationist role for the political forces it associates with, providing them with a democratic image (collaboration with national minorities).

### *Statutory Level*

The definitions of the UDMR do not encompass the European coordinate. This aspect can be retrieved only at the level of electoral programs and declarations of principles approved by the Congress. This European influence can easily be distinguished starting with 1997 in the political programs<sup>1</sup>.

### *The European Integration – General View*

The European option is a definitive one for the UDMR because "Romania has its place in the European family of developed countries, of western type democracies" and "remain outside the integration process would signify the obstruction of the economic and social perspective as in the domain of the defense policy". The European vision of the UDMR is at least global. Thus the foreign policy it supports pursues the accomplishment of three objectives, that it envisages treating together given their complete inter-connection: accelerate the Euro-Atlantic process (NATO) and European (UE, WEU, CEFTA); regulate the relations to the neighboring countries; ameliorate the Romanian image. The support shown by the Romanian population is a determining factor for the political choice operated by the UDMR:

*"The Romanian population pronounced in a proportion of 95% in favor of the NATO adhesion, a fact that constitutes an eloquent proof of the justness of our conviction that there is no and there could be no alternative to the European integration"*<sup>2</sup>.

How can a party be misled in such a way, I cannot say, is there a confusion or a constant of the post-communist political discourse in the logic of implicit association, the process of compensation established between the two integrationist processes (NATO-EU)?

### *The European Integration – Sectorial View*

The European integration is essentially promoted for the benefices it entails for the "Hungarian community", because the system of conditions it encompasses fore-

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<sup>1</sup> Already in 1996 the electoral manifests make reference to the European integration process. The main interests of the Magyar minority as they are mentioned by the 1995 Political program include: the integration of Romania in the European community. In the domain of foreign relations, the UDMR mentions it can adhere to international organizations or unions, and help this way also the general-European integration.

<sup>2</sup> Electoral Manifest 1996: "We are not all the same; for the presidential elections: Together in Europe!".



stalls the defense of the right of minorities. The political programs of the UDMR evolve in this sense, emphasizing the advantages brought about by the European integration to the Magyar community. Furthermore, the 2003 program suggests the direct participation of the UDMR to the negotiations for the European integration so as to ensure the respect of the interests of the Hungarian community.

### *România Mare Party (PRM)*

The PRM was created in 1991, following the immense success of the revue bearing the same name (*România Mare*) and proclaiming its apolitical character. The PRM is an opposition party its only participation to the government was during the *Red Quadrilateral* when a protocol of collaboration was signed with the PDSR, a partnership that lasted only ten months (20 January-15 October 1995). PRM is clearly an isolated political force. The party cooperates with the other political formations only inside the parliamentary arena. The isolation of the PRM becomes more evident after the 2000 elections, when the party gains a surprisingly 20% score in the legislative (four times higher than its usual score<sup>1</sup>). The score of its leader, Vadim Tudor, a presidential candidate is even more disturbing, he goes to the second tour of elections with 28%. This second tour sees the deployment of a consensual gathering of all the political parties around the democratic values and of Europeanism so as to stop the ascent of Vadim Tudor.

### *Statutory Level*

A first question arises. How to study the PRM? The PRM has been classified as an anti-system party (in the sense of Sartori) and thus implicitly anti-integrationist. The PRM is therefore the case study that best encompasses the limits of this research; the "official" discourse of the party (declarations of principles, party programs) is clearly infirmed by the positions taken by the party and its leader, since the PRM is the perfect example of *private party*<sup>2</sup>. A paradox circumscribes the PRM. It has received labels raging from national-communism to right-extremism, xenophobic and radical<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, it defines itself in a contradictory manner and using two criteria, a political one that would indicate its center-right position and an economical one that shows its center-left dimension<sup>4</sup>. The PRM justifies its doctrinaire choices by positioning itself at the reunion of left and right ideologies<sup>5</sup>, creating thus a hybrid of thought that draws its resources in both the national-communism epitomized by N. Ceaușescu as in the extreme-right movements<sup>6</sup>. The PRM does

<sup>1</sup> In 1992 at its first participation to the elections the PRM obtains 3.89% at the Chamber of Deputies and 3.85% at the Senate. In 1996 it receives 4.46% at the Chamber and respectively 4.45% at the Senate.

<sup>2</sup> Mauro CALISE, *Il partito personale*, Laterza, Roma, 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Tom GALLAGHER, *Romania's Greater Romania Party: Defying Political Categorisation?* ECPR Conference Marburg Germany 2003 (Panel title: "The East European Extreme Left: Ending or Evolution").

<sup>4</sup> PRM program 2004 [www.prm.org.ro](http://www.prm.org.ro).

<sup>5</sup> Tom GALLAGHER, *Romania's Greater Romania Party...*cit. pp. 5, 10-12.

<sup>6</sup> PRM National Doctrine 1996.

not hide its "Ceaușescu" nostalgia (whose anniversary it still celebrates) and through its message contributes to the support of the selective memory of the losers of transition<sup>1</sup>. By its declared desire to establish an authoritarian regime once in power, by its openly anti-racist messages, by its cult of the ethnic purity and its hate for the Magyars, the Jews and the Gypsies, it occupies an extreme-right, radical stance. The party seeks nevertheless to distance itself from this "offensive denomination" and *demonstrates* the "aberration of xenophobia" by the incompatibility between the Illuminated Nationalism it promotes and the "aberration of anti-Semitism" through the absence of Jews in Romania<sup>2</sup>. Since 2004, the leader V. Tudor promotes a "changed image" of the PRM. An image meant to demonstrate its true orientation<sup>3</sup>. Thus, even though the party definition remains the same between 1991 and 2004, it changes in the 2004 electoral year. The PRM searches a new international recognition, declaring its attachment to the Christian-Democratic and conservative values. This new identity is imagined by Tudor in the sense of Romania's integration to the EU. The PRM is therefore:

"A European party, a Christian and modern party, a moderated conservative party that will soon be a redoubtable partner in the process of edification of the United Europe. Our offer is formed by our dowry: of honesty, integrity, moral cleanness, perspicacity, professionalism and realism in the confrontation with the challenges of the contemporary world<sup>4</sup>. By its attachment to traditions, the Church, history and national values, the PRM can be inscribed of a strictly political point of view in the range of conservative parties. Whereas its economic doctrine make it closer to the Christian-Democratic family"<sup>5</sup>.

Later on, the definition is refined by the party program that declares as defining for its doctrine, the constitutive principles of the European Constitution project.

*PRM Pro-European. The National Interest,  
A Guide for the European Integration*

The fundamental principle that guides the internal and external policy of the PRM is the "NATIONAL INTEREST" (written in majuscules by all the programmatic documents). The PRM favors the European integration "because it is incontestable that the zone of European well-being is at the West of our country"<sup>6</sup>. The integration process is viewed as a necessity by the PRM although it has to be realized in complete respect of the national interest, "For the effectiveness of this process, the PRM demands the respect by the international organizations of the dignity and the traditions of our people"<sup>7</sup>. The proposals concerning the European

<sup>1</sup> "Les perdants de la transition" (term used by Jean Michel DE WAELE).

<sup>2</sup> Source: [www.prm.org.ro](http://www.prm.org.ro). See also the article by Michael SHAFIR, *Anti-Semitism without Jews*, in Jan Hancil, Michael Chase (eds.), *Anti-Semitism in Post-Totalitarian Europe*, The Franz Kafka Society, Prague, 1993, pp. 204-226

<sup>3</sup> Vadim Tudor seeks to prove his philo-Semitism by "the presence in his campaign staff of important figures of the political Israel scene" and its pro-Magyar orientation by "the presence of important Hungarian figures inside the PRM".

<sup>4</sup> National Council of the PRM 23-24 March 2004, "Their only salvation the PRMs!".

<sup>5</sup> Political Program PRM 2004.

<sup>6</sup> [www.prm.org.ro](http://www.prm.org.ro).

<sup>7</sup> Program PRM 1999.

integration are general in the period 1991-2004. It is only in 2004 that the political offer of the party is clearly marked by explicit references to the European dimension. The proposed objectives of the party are even though, quite disturbing. The PRM promises to privilege the fructification of the Romanian juridical tradition in the process of transposing the *acquis communautaire*<sup>1</sup>; moreover the PRM affirms its economical policy is founded on a constitutional article I could not identify... These observations question its capability of dealing with the integrationist process and denote its potentially *soft* Eurosceptic positioning.

### *"A United Europe, A Europe of Nations"*

The PRM stresses the importance of the existence of national states, opposing hence, the "unreal theories on the spiritualization or the transparency of boundaries or on the Europe of regions". So as to support its orientation, the PRM calls upon historic figures, such as N. Iorga or De Gaulle and poets as M. Eminescu. "The general De Gaulle had expressed his belief in a single Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals! A Europe of Homelands and Nations!". The PRM considers this vision as its own and militates for an ample and profound European unity realized in the interest of all the participant states "Nations represent the pylons of resistance of the European construction and for that they have to be powerful and equal".

## CONCLUSIONS

In trying to assess the potential influence played by the European coordinate in the consolidation of the Romanian party system, the main theoretical landmarks of the systemic analysis were reviewed. Secondly, the specific approach of this research was circumscribed by acknowledging two general approaches of the study of political parties (genetic and ideological convergence); the evaluation of the influence of the external constraint in the structuring of the new party systems was taken into consideration so as to allow the deployment of my analysis focusing on the Romanian party configuration and deploying from the general (the system level) to the particular (the six case-studies). The conclusions are following the same articulation: theoretic level, systemic approach and party analysis level.

In assessing the theoretical framework I imagined, the conclusions are arranged accordingly to the three sections of this research. The Romanian party system is defined by a gradual adaptation of the political actors to the dynamics of the democratic competition following a scheme quite different to the one experienced by the other post-communist systems of the region. In the Romanian case the weight of the communist past is the decisive element that influences the present political configuration. Thus, Romania experiences the democratic alternation (evaluated as a sign of democratic consolidation) at a later stage compared to the

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<sup>1</sup> This proposal is contrary to the present Romanian Constitution. The present Constitution (adopted by a referendum the 19 October 2003, and to which the PRM was opposed) states "Following the adhesion, the provisions of the constitutive treaties of the European Union as the other community prescriptions with a mandatory character have priority to the contrary dispositions of the internal laws" (Title VI, art. 148 paragraph [2]).

other post-communist countries and displays a stronger influence of the communist regime in what regards political competition and political configurations. The Romanian party system is articulated at its foundation around the FSN, a revolutionary movement integrating the members of the second echelon of the nomenclature (later on transformed in a political party in order to participate to the first "plebiscitary elections" of 1990) and the democratic opposition represented by the *historic parties*<sup>1</sup> (the PNȚCD, the PNL and the PSDR) in an unbalanced relation that sees the domination of the partisans of Ion Iliescu<sup>2</sup>. After this uninterrupted dominance of the FDSN/PDSR, governing between 1990 and 1996, a large coalition (CDR) wins the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1996. Romania would appear hence "to be late" in relation to the rest of the decommunized Europe through the victory of a *rainbow alliance* with a highly extensive ideological spectrum only in 1996. The breakdown of the CDR allows the reformed PDSR to gain power anew in 2000. Furthermore, the 2000 elections set out the annulment of the ex-/anticommunist cleavage, only the PNȚCD identifies itself at that date on an anticommunist stance and displays an electoral message clearly against the left (*Cheia împotriva stângii* / The Key against the Left). A first systemic stabilization is registered at this date around a party with an important potential of turning into a predominant party (in Sartori's sense), the PSD; with three other parties with an important electoral weight, the PRM (around 20% in 2000), the PD (around 15%) and the PNL (10%). The UDMR (around 7%) plays the role of pivot party, displaying an important coalition potential<sup>3</sup>. As for the PRM, it possesses a strong blackmail potential<sup>4</sup> but it is relegated by the entire political class to an isolated place because of its nationalist and extremist positions. The present rearrangement (2004) of the political configuration shows once more, the fragility of the political analyses in a late-transitional context.

The political alliances and coalitions integrate a European dimension to their identity but it is a derived issue and not a structuring one. The first hypothesis is confirmed. There is no direct effect of Europeanization on the political party system. Furthermore, the Romanian party system is not articulated around a pro-anti-European question. The European coordinate is present (especially in the temporal arc followed throughout this research) but it is a complementary dimension to the more general discourse. The second assumption stated at the outset of this study seems therefore confirmed, the European question is a secondary matter at the systemic level. The articulation of the actors is produced by oppositions that are not necessarily linked to the European issue. Therefore another typology has been privileged.

Given the fragility of the cleavages proposed so as to assess the Romanian case, I preferred an ideological classification conjointly with the positioning in three categories designed so as to show the parties specific oppositions. Thus the first party category is the one of the *revolutionary descendants* that later on assume a *Social-Democrat ideology* that is still a conflicting matter for the two actors (PSD and PD). The second class of parties refers to the principal *historic parties* (PNȚCD and

<sup>1</sup> "Historic parties" designate the parties founded after the 1989 revolution in the continuation of the interwar party tradition (before the instauration of communism).

<sup>2</sup> Ion Iliescu is the charismatic leader of the FSN and its subsequent forms: FDSN, PDSR, and PSD. He is furthermore the president of Romania in the periods: 1990-1992, 1992-1996 and 2000-2004.

<sup>3</sup> "A party may be small but have a strong coalition-bargaining power." (Giovanni SARTORI, *Parties...*cit., p. 123.)

<sup>4</sup> "Conversely, a party may be strong and yet lack coalition-bargaining power." (*Ibidem.*)

PNL) that adapt gradually to the new post-communist context. They oppose in the first period the revolutionary parties, especially the PSD following a communist-democrats/anti-communist tension, but their confrontation operates at different degrees. The third type of parties encompasses the *new parties* that break the alignment towards the communist regime; they are defenders of the national interest of the Hungarian minority in the first case (UDMR) and of the Romanian national interest in the second case (PRM).

How do the political parties legitimize in relation to Europe? Even though, Europe and the European integration gain a more important place in the political programs and statutory documents after 1996 and more specifically around 2000, they represent a secondary question for the political parties. Nevertheless, the European coordinate is an essential element in the *definition* of several parties. The PSD integrates this vision gradually; this internalization is the direct result of the redefinition of the party on a more accentuated Social-Democratic trajectory. The PD is the clearest case-study; its pro-Europeanism bears no doubtfulness. The PNȚCD is also pro-European and this even before the 1989 revolution; the pro-Europeanism of PNȚCD is associated to a strong anti-communist message; it is therefore anti-communist and pro-European. The PNL assumes its Liberal identity by tradition and importation (through its collaborations with the international Liberal parties) the two being associated to a pro-European option. The UDMR does not integrate to its political definition the European dimension; it is nevertheless pro-European given that this process will guarantee the respect of the rights of the minority it represents. The PRM confirms my first sub-hypothesis "the European coordinate is secondary and thus it is used in order to legitimize inside the political space" because its pro-Europeanism reveals only in 2004. Furthermore the conclusion of Taggart & Szczerbiak according to which there is no relation between the evolution of Euroscepticism and the evolution of the negotiation process is also infirmed by the PRM who chooses a more pro-European position despite its earlier *hard Eurosceptic* stance. Moreover, the PD displays nowadays a more Euro-pragmatic attitude given that the negotiation process was closed and that some chapters are considered to be detrimental to Romania. By and large the first sub-hypothesis is confirmed for all the case studies, the parties integrate to their identity profile the European orientation in a larger or lesser measure and afterward they use it so as to legitimize on the political scene.

The international legitimacy conferred by their participation to the party internationals, European party federations is thereafter proclaimed by the parties under scrutiny as a proof of their capabilities. All the parties (except the PRM that is not a part of the pan-European networks) *boast* their acceptance on the international scene and promise to use their personal contacts so as to promote the Romanian cause. A caricatured aspect in this sense, is the position of the PRM who couldn't integrate any party network but declares its privileged contacts with "the communities of the entire world and its enriching relations with all the world leaders". The parties that governed and had thus a direct contact with the negotiation process "make theirs" the successes registered by Romania and consider them as a sufficient proof of their capability of closing the accession process. All the parties confirm thus the third sub-hypothesis of the party analysis. The only exception is the PRM which did not govern and certifies its support for the European integration by the signing of the Declarations of Snagov (1995 and 2000) and by collaborating with the European organizations through its representatives in the Parliament.

As to the *particular visions* of the actors, the resemblances I identified at the doctrinaire level are striking. The party proposals regarding the government priorities are almost the same, according to the different doctrinaire principles they encompass. In a general manner, the parties envision the European integration in complete interdependence to the NATO integration. The PRM, the PSD, the PNL and in a lesser measure the PNȚCD, envisage the European integration as being directly connected to the defense of the national interest, to the safeguard of the autonomy of national decision. But my hypothesis is not confirmed by the PD who accentuates the national dimension only after 2001 and gradually adopts, after 2003, a more Eurosceptic positioning by its collaboration (inside the D.A. Alliance) with the Liberals of PNL. Furthermore, as it was already stated I found a direct link between the advancement or delaying of the negotiation process and the nationalist conception of the six parties; I am thus contradicting the conclusions of Taggart & Szczeciński that found a limited connection between the two elements. The fourth sub-hypothesis is thus infirmed by the findings of this study.

At a more in depth level of inquiry, clearer differences were identified. The PSD presents itself progressively as a pro-European party but displays nowadays all the same the most comprehensive image on the European integration process. This broad vision could easily be explained by its direct contact with the integrationist process in the last four years. For the PD, the European integration is a priority; it loses nevertheless importance in the party's programs. The new approach of the PD centers on the significance accorded to the internal policy making (local administration) as the necessary basis for the future integration to the EU. The PNȚCD is legitimized by its pre-1989 pro-European choice. The European integration is imagined thus as the return to the family it belongs to. The approach preferred by the PNȚCD is a personal one axed on the private contacts of its leaders with the members of the Christian-Democratic European parties. The PNL, also a historic party shares with the PNȚCD its early pro-European positioning but its vision is quite different. Romania will be integrated in the EU, in PNL's acceptance, once it has accomplished the necessary internal developments conceived in complete accordance with the Romanian traditions and specificities. The PNL is thus more closely attached to the conception of the PSD and the PRM, at least in what concerns the European integration. UDMR, an organization of defense of the interests of the Hungarian community in Romania has a representation of the European integration constructed upon this fundamental principle of its political existence. It is primarily concerned by the safeguard of the community interest and only afterwards by the general interests of the Romanian nation. The PRM displays surprisingly enough, a Europeanized character at the programmatic level. It is clearly a nationalist view on the European integration process but nevertheless PRM's vision on the integrationist process becomes more articulated in 2004, conformingly to its desire of being accepted on the Romanian political scene. It opts for a redefinition through the intermediary of an international recognition process, (as all the other parties analyzed here, first the party is recognized by the international organizations and consequently it can legitimize in the internal political space). It develops therefore a political conception adapted to the political families it wants to accede (through a prospective integration in the Conservative and Christian Democratic families). Thus, it still promotes a hybrid ideological profile at the intersection of different ideological dimensions.

The present study as I already stated, is nothing more but an instantaneous image of the Romanian political spectrum seen through a European lens. It offers

therefore but a sectorial image. The contemporarily character of this study further limits the above-mentioned findings. The political configuration in relation to the European dimension has already been modified all throughout this electoral year and as a result of the closing of the negotiations for the accession to the EU (in December 2004). Moreover, I preferred a more in detail look at the particular visions of the actors, providing but a limited systemic view. The conclusions of this study are therefore limited and can be enriched by future refinements and annotations dealing with the actions pursued by the political actors on the basis of the analyzed political programs; a declaration-real action type of analysis would facilitate to better understand the importance of the European constraint.